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Introduction 
I was an exchange student in Seoul National University from August of 2016 to June of 2017. 
During that time, something quite peculiar happened, something that I discussed with my 
professors, my student peers, and my friends alike. Coming from a very calm political culture 
where mass protests are a rare event and large scale political scandals are even more so, 
comprehending the magnitude and full meaning of the Choi Soon-sil gate was quite difficult, 
even if I watched it unfold from a very close distance. But it intrigued me, so much so that I 
abandoned my original idea for my graduate thesis of continuing with the topic I chose for 
my undergrad thesis, poverty in South Korea, and decided to write about the scandal instead.  
It took me months of thinking and brain storming to finally arrive to my final choice of 
research topic. Despite my self-doubt in my Korean capabilities and my general ability to 
tackle a totally new field of research, I decided to stick with it. Now, six months later, I know 
I made the right decision.  
While the general topic of this thesis is the political scandal of 2016-2017 surrounding then 
president Park Geun-hye, the actual research made is on the newspaper media and how it 
covered the main three people tangled in the scandal, namely president Park, her friend Choi 
Soon-sil, and vice-chairman of Samsung Group, Jay Y. Lee. More specifically, this is a media 
analysis of frames used when reporting on these three people by two different Korean 
newspapers, Hankyoreh and JoongAng Ilbo.  
With that being said, however, even writing the chapter on the timeline of the scandal required 
research of its own because there is no academic material available yet on this matter. Thus, 
it was up to me to use news sources to figure out what happened and when, so I could write a 
detailed description of how the events unfolded. The fact that not much has been published 
yet on this very recent chain of events not only made writing about it that much more difficult, 
but it has also given me great responsibility to do my work well. I hope I have done this topic 
justice. 
First, I will talk in length about the political scandal itself to establish a clear timeline for what 
happened between October of 2016 and April of 2017. Events that took place after that will 
not be included because this is the timeline of the article sample used for the analysis, but also 
because the final word is yet to be said on the case. At the time of writing this, Park still hasn’t 
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been convicted, leaving the whole chain of events without a conclusion. Perhaps a full, 
detailed account can be written once everyone involved has been finally sentenced. 
In the second chapter, I will explain the history of press freedom in South Korea and how that 
relates to this particular case. As will be shown later, writing about people in power, be it 
political or economic, has not always been something newspapers have been allowed to do in 
Korea. Although all direct control of the press has been erased, self-censorship in the press is 
still an issue, which gives an interesting premise for this research topic as well. Special 
attention will be paid to how Samsung Group has controlled or directed the press in the past, 
and also in present day. 
Third chapter is dedicated to explaining the theoretical and methodological background of the 
analysis made. I will also explain how the data sample was collected and how it was coded. 
This is done to give credibility for the analysis made in the next chapter, which will include 
both quantitative and qualitative aspects to ensure a broad scope of analysis. Lastly, 
conclusions will be drawn from the analysis chapter and each research question will be 
answered explicitly and concretely.  
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1 The political scandal and the people behind it 
In this chapter, I will explore the main reasons behind the 2016 political scandal concerning 
the now former president Park Geun-hye, and how these events unfolded. This is important 
to ensure a good understanding of what exactly happened in this peculiar chain of events, and 
to establish the timeline for the research and media analysis that will be the core of this thesis. 
I will also describe briefly the personal life of the woman at the root of this scandal, Choi 
Soon-sil, to come to a better understanding of her relationship with president Park and her 
involvement in the scandal at large. News articles and videos will be used as the main sources 
for this chapter, as there isn’t yet much academic material available. This is simply because 
of how recent this whole political scandal is.  
1.1 Who is Choi Soon-sil? 
Choi Soon-sil was born in 1956. Her father was Choi Tae-min, founder and leader of a 
religious cult in South Korea called the Church of Eternal Life. It was through her father’s 
connections with the Park family that she befriended Park Geun-hye in the 1970s. Choi Tae-
min was a close friend of Park Geun-hye’s father, president Park Chung-hee, and this 
friendship lasted until Park Chung-hee was assassinated in 1979. Kim Jae-gyu, the man who 
assassinated Park Chung-hee and at the time acted as the head of the KCIA, claimed that one 
reason to murder the authoritarian president was because Park could not get rid of Choi Tae-
min’s influence in his political decision making. (Choe 2016, Sala and Steger 2016.) It is 
possible to assert from this, that Choi Tae-min’s power over the president at the time was not 
considered beneficial or even positive by the people close to president Park. How many people 
besides Kim Jae-gyu believed this, is impossible to tell, but it is probable Kim was not alone 
with his opinion.   
Choi Tae-min also had a lot of influence over Park Geun-hye as her mentor, most likely 
following the assassination of her mother in 1974. Reportedly, Choi Tae-min claimed to be 
able to pass on messages from president Park’s late mother and to communicate with her even 
in the afterlife. (Choe 2016.) While this may sound bizarre to most, it is fair to keep in mind 
that to a grieving, young daughter this could have been of great comfort, especially right after 
the violent death of her mother. His role in her life most probably only strengthened after she 
also lost her father in 1979. 
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It is well-known to the Korean public that Choi Tae-min stayed close with Park Geun-hye 
until his passing in 1994. Their close bond resulted in numerous rumors concerning the nature 
of their relationship, mostly due to their large age gap of over 40 years. The wildest rumors 
even suggest Park Geun-hye had a child with Choi Tae-min, but no evidence support this. 
President Park has denied any allegations regarding the issue, stating that Choi Tae-min was 
simply a close mentor to her in her younger years. (Choe 2016, Sala and Steger 2016.)  
Choi Soon-sil grew close to Park Geun-hye in the 1970s, which is made evident with pictures 
of them together at different events around that time. It is now speculated that after the death 
of her father, she continued to play the role in president Park’s life that her father had 
previously played. (Choe, 2016.) The women are only four years apart in age, which could 
also in part explain their close bond. The close connection between the two women has been 
widely known in South Korea even years prior to the scandal of 2016, as rumors around Choi 
Soon-sil and her frequent visits to the Blue House, the president’s residence in South Korea, 
began to circulate as early as 2014 (Kim, O. 2014). 
Choi Soon-sil has never been a politician, however. In her personal endeavors, she has been 
a business and land owner since the 1980s. She was also previously married to Chung Yoon-
hoi, who worked as a chief of staff and a close aide to president Park in the early 2000s. Choi 
and Chung got divorced in 2014. (Kim, O. 2014.) Choi and Chung have a daughter called 
Chung Yoo-ra, who has also been more or less involved with the scandal of 2016. Her possible 
involvement in the controversy will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
What is worth pointing out here is that Choi Soon-sil has never acted as a politician or a 
government official, and has only played a supportive role in Park Geun-hye’s political 
campaigns and career. Her involvement in politics, then, is understandably a cause for concern, 
given that she is a civilian with no status to be meddling with government politics. The second 
point is her close connection to her father Choi Tae-min, and the questionable influence he 
reportedly held over both Park Chung-hee and Park Geun-hye. Had she come to Park Geun-
hye’s life under less suspicious circumstances, her actions might not have been brought to 
question in the way that they were. Because she appears to be following the questionable 
legacy of her father, it seems justified the press was suspicious of her frequent visits to the 
Blue House. 
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1.2 The Choi Soon-sil Gate  
Choi Soon-sil was in fact already under growing suspicion, and even investigation, before the 
bigger political scandal began in late October of 2016. Choi’s close connections with two 
allegedly non-profit foundations, called the Mir Foundation and the K-Sports Foundation, had 
been called to question shortly after they had been founded in late 2015 and early 2016, 
respectively. There were claims being made that she might have established the foundations, 
together with some presidential aides in the Park administration, solely for the purpose of 
personal gain. Officially, the foundations’ goals were to promote Korean culture and sports, 
and to help train professional athletes, but these claims were brought to question in the fall of 
2016. (Kim, B. 2016.)  
The Mir Foundation was founded in October of 2015, and the K-Sports Foundation in January 
of 2016. The chairman of the Mir Foundation was Yonsei University professor Kim Hyung-
su, who is said to have assumed the position mostly because of his ties with Cha Eun-taek. 
Cha was a key policy maker in the Park administration especially in the field of culture, and 
perhaps most importantly, a friend of Choi Soon-sil. (Kim, B. 2016.) Cha also earned himself 
the nickname ‘crown prince’ due to his rapid success in the Park administration (Kang and 
Hyun, 2016). Kim Hyung-su gave up his position in the foundation already in September of 
2016, as the investigation into the foundation and its purpose began. Several others were also 
involved in these foundations, both from within the Park administration, as well as outside of 
it. (Kim, B. 2016.)    
The allegations stated that these foundations had been used to gather funds forcibly from the 
big Korean conglomerates and their lobbying organizations, the sum estimated to be 
somewhere close to 80 billion won, which is a little under 60 million euros. Furthermore, it 
was said that the funds the foundations collected were then channeled into two shell 
companies owned by Choi Soon-sil and her daughter Chung Yoo-ra. These companies were 
called Widec Sports and Blue K, and they were both established in Germany. These 
companies are said to have used these funds to cover training expenses for Chung, a dressage 
athlete, and to buy properties in Germany. Cha Eun-taek was registered as the head of Blue 
K, which further demonstrated his close ties with Choi Soon-sil. (Kim, B. 2016, Kang and 
Hyun, 2016.) 
The heads of the Mir Foundation and the K-Sports Foundation, as well as others involved in 
founding them, claimed the conglomerates had funded the foundations only through voluntary 
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donations, and had not been forcibly coerced into doing so. President Park also denied any 
involvement with these foundations and their alleged wrongdoings. Despite these claims of 
innocence, the prosecutors continued their investigation into the foundations’ operations. At 
this point, Choi Soon-sil and her daughter had left South Korea, as well as Cha Eun-taek and 
others involved, most likely to avoid prosecution. (Kim, B. 2016.)  
The investigation into Choi Soon-sil’s activities soon broadened beyond just the scope of 
these two foundations. This eventually led to the complete revelation of her close involvement 
with president Park and her administration. As stated previously, it was already well-known 
that she acted as a close confidant to the president, but the true nature of their relationship was 
only brought to light in this scandal.  
The official starting point for the political scandal that would result in president Park’s 
impeachment was October 24th, 2016, when JTBC Newsroom, an independent news channel, 
revealed in its newscast that Choi Soon-sil had reportedly received 44 presidential speeches 
from the Blue House before president Park herself, and up to 200 confidential government 
documents, the speeches included. According to the JTBC Newsroom newscast, their 
investigation team discovered this information by acquiring a tablet computer that Choi Soon-
sil had used and then abandoned close to her office, apparently to be disposed of. The tablet 
computer data showed that Choi Soon-sil had received presidential speeches up to three days 
before the president herself, and had even made changes and edits to said speeches. (Kim, T. 
et al 2016, Son 2016.)  
This was considered condemning mostly because Choi Soon-sil did not hold any government 
post and didn’t have security clearance, which meant that she wasn’t in a position to be 
reviewing or approving presidential speeches, let alone other confidential government files. 
These speeches found on the tablet computer included some of the most important speeches 
president Park had given during her administration, casting doubt over who was making the 
important policy decisions- elected president Park, or Choi Soon-sil? This also was a violation 
on security laws on president Park’s behalf (Son 2016). 
Evidence for how much influence Choi held over president Park and her whole administration 
built up quickly after the JTBC broadcast. The evidence suggested that Choi had access to 
president Park’s schedules, personnel arrangements, travel itineraries, and classified 
information like secret military meetings. Not only this, but it was also later revealed that 
Choi controlled also president Park’s wardrobe, and one news channel even broadcast a video 
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of Choi giving orders to president Park’s aides. (Choe 2016, Kim, H. 2016.) All these 
appeared quite troubling for the Korean public, who began to call Choi ‘shadow president’ or 
‘shadow leader’, further questioning if president Park really held any power over her own 
administration and policies.  
What is of importance here is to connect the corruption allegations made against the Mir 
Foundation and the K-Sports Foundation and Choi’s involvement in them that preceded the 
discoveries made on her tablet computer. Choi’s name had already been tarnished with 
possible corruption and bribery in a very high-profile case that involved well-known figures 
in the Park administration. For it to be made clear that she also had quite a lot of power over 
the Blue House and president Park did not reflect well on president Park. The Korean public 
did not react well to this news, as these revelations cast doubt over how democratic and lawful 
the rule of the Park administration was. 
What also added to the anger and disappointment Koreans felt regarding the whole issue, was 
the scandal involving Chung Yoo-ra. It had also been revealed during the fall of 2016 that she 
had received preferential treatment from Ehwa Women’s University, where she was enrolled 
at the time. Both her enrollment in the university and her academic performance were brought 
to question under the suspicions that she had received unfair advantages. The basis for her 
acceptance and enrollment were disputed, and it was also revealed she had received good 
grades in her classes despite failure to attend and to submit assignments on time. It was also 
revealed that Choi Soon-sil had visited the school on several occasions. (Chung, 2016.) This 
scandal began around the same time as the one concerning the Mir Foundation and the K-
Sports Foundation did.  
Enrollment into university is very crucial to most young Koreans after they graduate from 
high school. Ehwa Women’s University is one of the top universities, and to be accepted into 
Ehwa, or any other renowned university in Korea, takes a lot of hard work from the students. 
Many are often left disappointed, or try year after year to be admitted into their desired 
university. Top high schools, private academies, etc. are a huge business in South Korea, and 
it is often a great effort and sacrifice on the whole family’s part to give their teenage child the 
best education possible to enable them to be accepted into one of these top-level universities. 
This is why the news of someone getting in unfairly, and furthermore passing their classes 
without putting in the work required, angered Korean university students as well as the public 
at large. (see Lee, C. 2005, Lee, J. 2006, Kim. S and Lee, J. 2010, Seth 2002.) 
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The professors’ association of Ehwa Women’s University formed an investigative committee 
to look into alleged preferential treatment of Chung Yoo-ra, and demanded the truth on the 
matter be disclosed. The students at Ehwa Women’s University, as well as some of the 
professors, staged protest rallies on campus because of this issue. These allegations lead to 
the resignation of Choi Kyung-hee, the president of the university, only days before the true 
beginning of the political scandal involving Choi Soon-sil and president Park. (Chung 2016, 
Choe 2016, Son 2016.)  
1.3 Calls for impeachment begin 
President Park was quick to make a public apology after the JTBC Newsroom broadcast. The 
Blue House had tried to deny all such accusations at first, but it was soon left with no other 
choice but to admit to them, as more evidence on the issue continued to surface. President 
Park made her apology on Oct. 25th, 2016, and her public appearance lasted less than 12 
minutes. In her announcement, she acknowledged her ties to Choi Soon-sil, and admitted to 
having sought her council during her presidency and allowing her to edit her speeches. 
President Park said that Choi had only offered ‘personal thoughts and opinions’ as well as 
help with ‘phrasing and other things’ on the presidential speeches, nothing more. (Choe 2016, 
Kim, H. 2016.) She also claimed that Choi only assisted her during her campaign and at the 
very beginning of her term, before she had a system of advisors and staff in place (Evans 
2016). 
In her public address, president Park described Choi as a close friend who had stood by her 
through difficult times, such as the violent deaths of her mother and father in the 1970s. She 
apologized to the Korean people for her actions. (Choe 2016, Kim, H. 2016.) However, her 
public appearance did very little to calm down the press or the public, and cleared up almost 
close to nothing. Everything she admitted to in her speech was already common knowledge 
by then. 
On the following day, the prosecutors searched Choi’s apartment, the offices of the Mir 
Foundation and the K-Sports Foundation, as well as the homes of her closest associates. On 
that same day, an extensive interview with former employee at the Mir Foundation, Lee Sung-
han, was published on Hankyoreh. Lee put forth further evidence of Choi’s influence in 
president Park’s administration. He said that Choi had her own team of advisors who 
influenced government decisions from cabinet appointments to policies towards North Korea, 
and they would hold meetings on daily basis to negotiate such issues. Lee also said that Choi 
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received regular reports directly from the Blue House, basically acquiring all the same 
documents as the president, and that all decisions made in the Park administration had to be 
approved by her. He said that they would devise project plans at these meetings with Choi, 
that would then later become official Blue House documents without any changes made to 
them. Lee also told Hankyoreh that Cha Eun-taek attended these meetings very regularly. 
(Choe 2016, Kim and Ryu 2016.) 
On October 28th, president Park continued to take measures to get the situation under her 
control. She dismissed all of her top advisors in her staff, and promised to reshuffle her 
personnel. Again, this did very little to reassure anyone, and political analysts in the country 
and even overseas predicted a total collapse of her leadership and political credibility. (Fifield 
and Seo 2016.) Her plummeting approval ratings suggested as much, as polls over the 
following weeks showed her public support declining rapidly. On the first week following the 
outbreak of the scandal, her approval ratings went down from around 30 percent overall to 
around 10 percent. On the weeks after that, the Gallup data showed a continued downward 
trend, as the ratings went down as low as 1-3 percent in people aged 60 years or younger. Her 
approval rating was slightly better in those over 60 years of age, but was also barely over 10 
percent. This is the lowest approval rating any South Korean president has ever received since 
the beginning of these polls. (Denney 2016, Sohn 2016, Son 2016.) With approval ratings as 
low as these, it was becoming more obvious that it would be very difficult for her to regain 
the public’s confidence and trust.  
Public protests demanding president Park to step down began instantly. The first rally was 
held on the following Saturday after the JTBC broadcast on October 29th, with estimates 
ranging from 10,000 to 20,000 people protesting in Seoul alone. Other protests were held in 
other parts of the country as well. (Denney 2016, Hu 2016.) These protests would become a 
weekly occurrence, taking place every Saturday in Gwanghwamun Square in central Seoul, 
demanding for the impeachment of president Park until it finally happened. 
1.4 Arrest of Choi and impeachment of president Park 
Choi Soon-sil returned to South Korea on October 30th from Germany. Before her return, she 
gave only one interview to Segye Ilbo, where she admitted to having received drafts of 
president Park’s speeches but denied all other accusations made against her. (McCurry 2016.) 
What is worth noting, though, is that Segye Ilbo is owned by the Unification Church, another 
formidable religious movement in South Korea. The Unification Church, like Choi Tae-min’s 
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Church of Eternal Life, is tied to several controversies, but it holds far more power in South 
Korea than Choi Tae-min’s sect ever did. It is telling, however, that Choi chose to only speak 
to Segye Ilbo and not any of the biggest news outlets in the country. Upon her arrival to South 
Korea, her attorney promised she would comply with the prosecutors’ requests, and would 
testify honestly and according to the facts. Her attorney also conveyed her apology to the 
public for causing distress and disturbances. (McCurry 2016.) 
Choi was detained under emergency detention the following day, on October 31st, and was 
brought to the supreme prosecutor’s office in Seoul on November 1st. Prosecutors made a 
court request for an arrest warrant on November 2nd to keep her under custody in the fear that 
she might try to destroy any further evidence, and she was officially arrested later that day. 
(Reuters in Seoul 2016, Williams 2017.) President Park apologized to the public again on 
November 3rd, and agreed to an investigation into her actions by prosecutors, despite her 
immunity from actual prosecution as ruling president (Associated Press 2016). On November 
6th, two of president Park’s former aides were also arrested for colluding with Choi 
(Associated Press 2016).  
Finally, Choi as well as the two former aides were indicted on a number of charges on 
November 20th. At the same time, the prosecutors said that president Park “played a collusive 
role in a considerable portion of the criminal activities”. The prosecutors acknowledged that 
they couldn’t officially prosecute the president while still in office, but promised to continue 
the probe into her actions. (Williams 2016, Agence France-Presse 2016.) 
At the same time, weekly demonstrations continued to be held in Seoul, demanding for 
president Park’s impeachment. The demonstrations continued to grow in number of 
participants, although the estimates vary depending on the sources used. President Park 
offered to step down on November 29th, asking the parliament to arrange for her term to be 
cut short so she could resign. Officially, her term was not to end until February 2018. The 
opposition refused to do this, however, saying that she was only trying to avoid the 
humiliation of impeachment and to prolong the process of settling the political scandal. (Park 
and Kim 2016, McCurry 2016.) 
On December 3rd, three opposition parties introduced an impeachment motion, signed by 171 
members out of the 300-seat legislature (Jun 2016). The motion was put to a vote on 
December 9th, and with 234 votes out of 300 and with the required 2/3 majority thus achieved, 
president Park was impeached by the parliament. Many political analysts attributed this to the 
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persistent demonstrations held by the people for consecutive weeks, proving to even president 
Park’s ruling party Saneuridang that if the motion didn’t pass, it wouldn’t reflect well on the 
party and its future. (McCurry 2016, Kishore 2016.) 
After the impeachment of president Park by the parliament, the legitimacy of the 
impeachment had to be assessed by the Constitutional Court of South Korea. The nine judges 
of the Constitutional Court held hearings and meetings starting from January of 2017, and 
gave their verdict on March 10th, 2017. Their unanimous decision was to uphold the 
parliament’s vote, effectively making the impeachment official and permanent. (Evans 2017, 
McCurry 2017.) By removing her from office, the impeachment made Park lose her immunity 
from prosecution, which would shortly lead to her arrest.  
1.5 Samsung joins the scandal and Park’s arrest 
What happened during the Constitutional Court’s decision-making process is also important, 
both to the political scandal at large as well as for this thesis. Leaders of big conglomerates 
were brought in to be probed by the parliament in December of 2016, Samsung Group vice-
chairman Jay Y. Lee, or JY Lee, included. Their donations to the Mir Foundation and the K-
Sports Foundation were scrutinized to determine their role in it, in other words, if they had 
truly been forced to donate funds, or if they collaborated willingly. In that hearing, Lee denied 
having made those donations with the hopes of receiving any favors for his company. 
Samsung Group made the biggest donations to the two foundations out of all conglomerates 
involved, the sum totaling over 20 billion won, or 15 million euros. At this point, none of the 
conglomerates were accused of any wrongdoing. (Reuters 2016.)  
The situation changed in January of 2017, as Lee was summoned by the prosecutors to be 
investigated as a suspect in the bribery case. The spokesman for the special prosecution team 
said on January 11th that they were looking into whether or not Lee bribed Choi to gain 
government favors. Such favors included government approval of the controversial Samsung 
merger in 2015 that was heavily opposed by minority shareholders, while Lee and his family 
were the biggest beneficiaries. The merger ensured Lee’s position at the top of the company, 
so the prosecutors felt that it was a strategic move on his part, rather than a rational choice 
made for the good of the Samsung Group. Two Samsung executives were also questioned on 
the case. (Associated Press 2017.) 
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Already on January 16th, the prosecutors sought an arrest warrant on Lee on charges of bribery, 
embezzlement, and perjury. They said that Lee had in fact paid up to 43 billion won, or 35 
million euros, in bribes to Choi, her companies, the Mir Foundation, and the K-sports 
Foundation. In return for the money, Park and the Blue House pressured the National Pension 
Service to support the merger of the Samsung affiliates, as it held a deciding vote on the 
decision due to its shares in the Samsung Group. The merger created losses for the NPS, 
which is why it was considered odd for it to agree to it. The prosecutors said that while they 
understood the economic implications of possibly arresting Lee, they felt that serving justice 
was far more important. (Kim, B. 2017, McCurry 2017.)  
Arresting the Samsung Group leader was not quite so easy. The Seoul central district court 
refused the arrest warrant, claiming that they didn’t see justification for arresting Lee. Lee 
was released from detention on January 19th after the court’s decision. Immediately, people 
called this decision to question, accusing the court of making a biased decision simply because 
of the influence the Samsung Group holds in South Korea. (McCurry 2017.) 
It took almost another month before Lee was finally arrested. The prosecutors rebuilt their 
case against him and brought it to the court once more with further evidence of Lee’s criminal 
actions to back it up. Lee was successful arrested on February 17th, with the court spokesman 
saying that the court thought it necessary to arrest him in the light of new evidence and the 
newly added criminal charges. The prosecutors alleged that Lee had given bribes not only 
related to the 2015 merger, but also related to his succession to power within Samsung Group. 
They also said they found evidence of hiding profits from criminal activities and hiding assets 
overseas. The decision to arrest Lee was made on the same grounds as with Choi, as the court 
feared Lee might try to destroy evidence or flee the country to avoid prosecution. (McCurry 
2017, Kang and Lee 2017.) This was commonly seen as a step to the right direction and away 
from the past, where big conglomerates like Samsung have been able to avoid the law thanks 
to their close-knit ties with the government.  
Lee was then officially indicted on February 28th. Together with him, four other Samsung 
executives were also charged on bribery, embezzlement, and hiding assets overseas. Lee was 
the only one to be charged with perjury in front of the parliament for his allegedly false 
testimony in the parliament hearing in December. (McCurry 2017, Kim, H. 2017.) 
It took another month for impeached president Park to also be arrested and then indicted. The 
prosecutors announced their plan to apply for an arrest warrant on March 27th, and she was 
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arrested early in the morning of March 31st. Park was formally indicted on multiple charges 
like bribery, abuse of power, coercion, extortion, and leaking classified government 
information on April 4th. (Park 2017, Associated Press 2017, Guardian staff and agencies 
2017.)  
1.6 Timeline for the scandal 
 
 
 
2 Media in South Korea: a struggle for freedom 
In this chapter, I will explain the historical context of press freedom in South Korea in brief, 
and also explain why this research topic is of such importance. As the people involved in this 
scandal represent both politicians and business owners of the big conglomerates, press 
freedom on both sides will be explored in adequate detail. Choi could be classified as a 
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business owner as well, but her wealth or power come nowhere near that of Lee’s in this 
regard. Thus, it’s more appropriate to regard her as so called regular citizen in that she did not 
hold a government post, was not an elected politician, and is not the head of a big 
conglomerate or any major corporation.    
2.1 Press freedom in the past 
It is unnecessary for the scope of this thesis to explore the full development of press freedom 
in the history of South Korea, but a brief summary is in order. Under the first republic, the 
Rhee Seung-man administration, the press enjoyed relative freedom from state control, at least 
in comparison to what was to come. The Rhee administration did outlaw leftist newspapers 
and even forced some to shut down, but at the same time the press was still able to criticize 
some of the wrong-doings of the government. It could even show support to the student 
demonstrations in April 1960 that eventually led to president Rhee being forced to resign. 
(Kwak 2012, 7-8, Sung and Hyok 2009, 176.)  
This changed with the Park Chung-hee administration in 1962. Censorship was imposed on 
all media, and the majority of the newspapers came under the direct control of the military 
regime. Only some newspapers, such as Dong-A, Kyunghyang, Chosun, and Maeil, could hold 
up some forms of resistance, but these had to also succumb to the government in the years to 
come. They were brought under government control by different means, such as forcing them 
to be sold to pro-government companies, arresting journalists, forced firings of journalists, 
intimidating the advertisers, and bribing the newspapers with huge loans and other favors. All 
newspapers were effectively silenced by 1968. Under the Yushin constitution, the suppression 
was also applied to foreign correspondents. Foreign media and their representatives faced 
different forms of harassment, ranging from censorship to closing down news bureaus and 
deporting correspondents. (Kwak 2012, 8-12, Sung and Hyok 2009, 176, Kang, M. 2005, 78.) 
The Chun Doo-hwan government was no better. After coming to power in 1980, the Chun 
administration enforced reporting guidelines on all forms of media under the Basic Press Law. 
These outlines included prohibiting media from criticizing the government or the martial law, 
along with many other limitations on reporting and broadcasting. The government also 
prepared a blacklist of journalists who should be dismissed from media outlets, although the 
number of journalists fired from their jobs far exceeded the number of journalists listed. 
Several magazines were forced to shut down, and foreign media was still closely monitored. 
(Kwak 2012, 15-21, Kang, M. 2005, 79.)  
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Independent news agencies and broadcasting agencies were absorbed into state-run agencies, 
and several provincial newspapers were forced to shut down, giving the government full 
control of all forms of media (Sung and Hyok 2009, 177). This, together with the willing 
collusion between the media owners, journalists, and the Chun regime, effectively created a 
press cartel fully under the Chun administration’s control (Kim, C. 2016, 16). 
From 1987 onwards, together with the emergence of democratic government with the Rho 
Tae-woo administration, the press freedom also improved drastically. New dailies and 
periodicals grew dramatically in number, and the press moved away from direct state control 
to market control. (Kwak 2012, 30-38.) The new constitution guaranteed press freedom, at 
least in theory (Sung and Hyok 2009, 177). The Basic Press Law was officially abolished and 
replaced by the Act on Registration of Periodical Publication that loosened regulations on 
printing businesses and focused on the healthy development of the press (Kim, C. 2016, 17). 
But, despite their new-found freedom, the major newspapers with the biggest circulation, all 
conservative in their political stance, emerged as powerful media conglomerates that rather 
than standing up to the government continued to collude with it instead. In other words, 
despite their freedom to criticize the government and expose its wrong-doings, the major 
papers opted not to do so. (Kwak 2012, 30-38, Kang, M. 2005, 82.) But the rapid emergence 
of more newspapers, more varied in their political alignments, brought a newfound pluralism 
to the now market controlled field of press media (Kim, C. 2016, 17). Even if the established 
newspapers still weren’t keen on changing their course, the increased competition was still 
bringing the winds of change to the Korean news media. 
1993 and the Kim Young-Sam administration brought about stronger pluralism in news 
reporting, both in the topics they wrote about and the news sources used. But while 
government criticism was finally allowed, the government still tried to control the media 
mostly through president Kim’s personal ties with the owners of newspapers and the 
journalists. Private networks, collusion, nepotism, etc. were used to appease the reporters to 
maintain a favorable relationship between the government and the press. (Kwak 2012, 38-48, 
Kang, M. 2005, 81.) At the same time, as advertisement revenue began to constitute a bigger 
part of the newspapers’ revenue, the advertisement agencies and the chaebols behind those 
agencies gained more influence. Newspapers that were more dependent on their advertisers 
would obviously be less likely to go against their best interest, in this case the chaebols. (Kim, 
C. 2016, 17-18.) 
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The only politicians the press felt comfortable to expose for their mistakes or even crimes 
were the political actors who no longer held any power. When president Kim became involved 
in scandals, first for accepting dirty money from Rho Tae-woo in 1992 which was exposed in 
1996, and then for his son’s involvement in bribery, corruption, etc., most of the conservative 
media remained silent. It was only on his last year in office and after the public opinion turned 
against him, that the press finally turned on him as well. (Kwak 2012, 38-48.) 
The emergence of reformist government under Kim Dae-jung administration improved press 
freedom. The biggest newspapers, all conservative, felt they could criticize the progressive 
government more openly, and there was growing tension between the state and the media. 
But there were some inherent issues with the newspaper industry that might have affected 
press freedom adversely. In the 2000s, the industry was dominated by three dailies, Chosun, 
Dong-A, and JoongAng, which were responsible for almost 70 percent of all newspaper 
circulation. There was also a lack of transparent and fair competition. (Kwak 2012, 53-56, 
Kang, M. 2005, 85.) This will be explored in further detail in the next chapter.  
For the Rho Mu-hyun administration, the relationship between the government and the 
conservative newspapers continued as confrontational and antagonistic. President Rho was 
quite clear in his favoritism, giving interviews only to the reformist newspapers. When it came 
to the conservative newspapers, he used the rule of law as a control measure, more specifically 
lawsuits filed against newspapers and media reports. (Kwak 2012, 57-68.) Journalists felt, 
however, that the media could criticize political powers without having to fear any unlawful 
consequences. Yet at the same time, the market powers still held sway over most publications. 
(Gong and Rawnsley 2017.)  
Online media emerged and grew rapidly, quickly challenging the traditional media. Most of 
the online newspapers launched in the 2000s were reformist and liberal, adding to the 
polarization in the media. The ideological orientation of the media has been proven to affect 
the ways in which news are handled and how they are framed. (Kwak 2012, 57-68.) This issue 
will also be examined in more detail in the following section.  
In conclusion, it can be said that the official democratization of South Korea in 1987-1988 
did not bring about complete press freedom or fully matured, democratic media overnight. 
The process of achieving media capable of criticizing the government and presidents still in 
power was slow, and only somewhat materialized in the 2000s. It can be said that the news 
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media in South Korea is no longer controlled by the government, although the newspaper’s 
political and ideological stance plays a role in how it reports on any one issue.  
2.2 Newspapers and scandals 
Since South Korea’s newspapers have now reached complete freedom from government 
control, or at least there are no longer laws or official censorship in place that would prohibit 
them from reporting whatever they wish, have they now reached a level of maturity and 
accountability that is usually seen as a requirement for a democratic state and its press? 
Democracy requires accountability, which makes it necessary to have a ‘free press willing 
and able to expose corruption’ (Kwak 2012, 70 > Diamond 1996, 117). In a mature democracy, 
the news media should be ‘a mechanism for promoting accountability of those in positions of 
power by publishing information that other parties would want to keep secret’ (Kwak 2012, 
70). In other words, journalism should expose corruption and other wrong-doings by those in 
positions of power, be it political or economic. The question then is, have South Korean 
newspapers been able to do that? For the purpose of this thesis, looking at reporting on 
political and economic scandals is of most significant importance, given the people involved 
in the Choi Soon-sil gate. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the three biggest dailies hold almost 70 percent of the 
market share. Given that they all share a conservative ideological stance, they also have a lot 
of influence on the South Korean society. It is also worth noting here that JoongAng, one of 
the big three papers, was owned by the Samsung Group until 2000, when it was sold to its 
affiliates. But JoongAng has maintained close ties with the Samsung Group through family 
relationships. JoongAng was founded in 1965 by Lee Byung-chul, the founder and the late 
chairman of Samsung, and Hong Jin-ki, former Minister for Internal Affairs. Hong’s son, 
Hong Seok-hyun, acted as the publisher of JoongAng until 2015, and he’s the brother-in-law 
of the former chairman of Samsung Group, Lee Kun-hee. Lee Kun-hee is the son of Lee 
Byung-chul and the father of Jay Y. Lee. The Lee family also has close ties to Dong-A through 
marriage. (Kwak 2012, 72-73; Korea JoongAng Daily 2015, Huffington Post 2014.) 
The current publisher of JoongAng is Hong Seok-hyun’s son, Hong Jeong-do. What is 
fascinating about Hong Jeong-do is that he is the CEO and president of JTBC, although it is 
probably fair to assume that the JTBC Newsroom was not aware the Choi Soon-sil gate would 
also later tarnish the reputation of Jay Y. Lee. JoongAng Media Network is the largest 
shareholder of JTBC with 25% of the total shares, and Hong is also the CEO of JoongAng 
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Media Network. (Korea JoongAng Daily 2015, Choi, H. 2011.) These connections between 
JoongAng and the Samsung Group are good to keep in mind in the analytical part of this thesis, 
as it is more than likely that the close ties could affect the way JoongAng frames Jay Y. Lee. 
 
In general, the conservative papers are mostly family run businesses, like most chaebols in 
Korea, while the progressive papers tend to have a wider base of ownership. Hankyoreh is 
entirely owned by its employees, in Kyunghyang the employees all together are the majority 
shareholder, and Munhwa and Seoul Daily have employee-ownership of about 40% of the 
total shares. (Kwak 2012, 72-73.) This is of importance because with a newspaper owned or 
run by only one family, it runs the risk of advocating for the interests and ideologies of that 
family. Then again, it can be argued that Hankyoreh or Kyunghyang have not been neutral in 
their journalism, and they have not been very balanced in their content either, despite their 
more varied ownership. They also have ties to certain political groups, possibly jeopardizing 
their ability to be politically neutral or unbiased. (Kwak 2012, 73-74.)  
As was discussed in the previous section, South Korean newspapers have slowly regained 
their independence from the government and starting from the early 2000s, have been able to 
criticize the government and even the administrations in power at the time. The emergence of 
politically diverse newspapers has meant that there is always going to be a newspaper who 
feels ready to criticize whoever is in power; conservative newspapers have no hesitations to 
write about progressive politicians, and vice versa. Thus, it can be said that the newspapers 
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‘have become very vigilant of any wrongdoing of the president, politicians or government 
officials’ (Kwak 2012, 80). The Park administration did make an effort to curb criticism of 
its policies through invoking the National Security Law and a criminal ban on defamation, 
which was seen as a threat to press freedom at large (Freedom House 2016). But in the end, 
these measures could not silence the media in the Choi Soon-sil gate. 
South Korean newspapers are fulfilling their watchdog role in society when it comes to 
politics, but can the same be said with economic corruption, especially when it involves the 
big conglomerates? The answer to this is unfortunately no. A general pattern can be observed 
in the way the major newspapers, especially those with close ties to these conglomerates, 
report on any scandals or wrongdoings by them. First, when the scandal surfaces, the major 
newspapers try to avoid the subject by either ignoring it or reporting only the basic facts. Once 
the issue becomes big enough for prosecutors to take action, these newspapers will feel forced 
to finally report on it, but usually side with the conglomerate by trying to justify its actions. 
After the prosecution finds concrete evidence of crime and a verdict is given, the newspapers 
will typically continue to defend the chaebols, especially by arguing that punishing them will 
jeopardize the economic situation of South Korea. (Kwak 2012: 81-83, Kwak 2012 > Je and 
Lee, 2007.) 
The major newspapers are thus exercising some levels of self-censorship by either ignoring 
the scandals as they emerge, or by framing the articles in such a manner that is favorable for 
the conglomerate in question. But aside from self-censorship, there is also concrete evidence 
of these companies purposefully trying to silence or at least punish newspapers that are critical 
of them. Since the scandal that is the focus of this thesis also involves the Samsung Group, it 
is interesting to look at how the Samsung Group has dealt with newspapers in the past in times 
of crisis. This is not to say that other big chaebols haven’t acted the same, or achieved similar 
results with other means, but the behavior of the Samsung Group is just the most relevant for 
the topic of this research.  
The Samsung Group was previously in a scandal from 2007 to 2009 with its previous 
chairman Lee Kun-hee for transferring funds to his son illegally, tax evasion, breaches of trust, 
and illegal bond dealings. Lee Kun-hee was later pardoned from his sentence by president 
Lee Myung-bak, which was a very controversial decision. President Lee justified this decision 
on the grounds that Lee was needed to boost South Korea’s bid for the 2018 winter Olympics, 
since Lee was a member of the International Olympic Committee. Lee Kun-hee denied any 
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wrongdoing and accused the media for ‘defining Samsung as a criminal organization’. (Kwak 
2012: 85-86, McNeill and Kirk, 2013.) 
To deal with the scandal and in an effort to control the press, Samsung withdrew its 
advertising from Hankyoreh and Kyunghyang. Hankyoreh and Kyunghyang had written 
critically about the scandal, and criticized Lee Kun-hee. Samsung virtually stopped 
advertising in them entirely, while still advertising quite heavily in the conservative 
newspapers Chosun, JoongAng, and Dong-A. Samsung’s boycott worked; as the ads 
disappeared, the critical articles also vanished. These papers stopped criticizing the Samsung 
Group altogether, effectively sending a message of just how powerful the conglomerate is. 
(Kwak 2012: 86-87.) Hankyoreh and Kyunghyang had to go as far as to cut and suspend wages 
to survive the financial situation Samsung’s withdrawal of advertisements put them in (Kim, 
J. 2011, Choi, B. 2009). 
The threat of losing advertisement revenue alone is sometimes enough to discourage papers 
from criticizing Samsung. In 2010, when a book titled Think Samsung by Kim Yong-chul, 
the whistleblower of the 2007 scandal, came out, Kyunghyang Daily rejected an article written 
in favor of the book that also criticized Samsung. The columnist who wrote that article made 
this public online, and eventually Kyunghyang had no choice but to openly admit it had 
refused that article for fear that it might lose Samsung’s advertising again after having just 
gained it back. (Kwak 2012: 88, Kim, M. 2017.) It is obvious that not only did the withdrawal 
of advertisements silence the newspapers at the time of the scandal, but it also made them 
cautious of criticizing the company in the future as well. Samsung is the single largest 
advertiser in South Korea, so it holds a lot of sway even in companies not directly under its 
control (Kwak, J. 2015). 
But this is not all. The trial against Jay Y. Lee and other Samsung executives in the Choi 
Soon-sil gate trials revealed the willingness of different media outlets to collude with 
Samsung as text messages sent to one of the executives, Jang Chung-gi, came to light as 
prosecutors’ evidence in the case. The messages were sent in August 2016 by different media 
executives and journalists. In their messages, they asked for different kinds of favors from 
Jang, either for personal gain or for their newspapers, and in return promised positive 
coverage for Samsung. (Kim, M. 2017.) 
In other messages, Jang was briefed on senior appointments at one popular daily, and the 
trustworthiness of a managing editor at Yonhap News, the biggest news agency in South 
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Korea. There are also messages from his subordinates informing him of their efforts to censor 
and control Naver and Daum. (Kim, M. 2017.) Naver and Daum are the two biggest internet 
portals in South Korea, functioning in roles similar to Google in North America and Europe. 
Most interestingly, and this is perhaps the most telling about Samsung’s influence, the media 
coverage on these leaked texts was rather small. Furthermore, articles written about the issue 
were also quickly deleted, or they didn’t appear on the main page of Naver where they would 
have been seen by most users. (Min 2017, Kim, D. 2017.) It is ironic how the press was either 
silenced or self-censored itself when reporting on a case about how Samsung controls the 
media. 
As shown here, the media keeps quiet about Samsung out of fear of losing advertisement 
revenue, but also in the hopes of gaining something out of colluding with the conglomerate. 
In her interview with The Guardian, senior media researcher Pang Hui-kyong from Sogang 
university institute for media and culture confirms that this attitude of self-censorship 
definitely exists in South Korean news media. She also points out how many people feel that 
any crisis Samsung faces is also a national crisis, which means that protecting Samsung is 
also in best interest for the whole country. This ‘Samsung ideology’ warrants its preferential 
treatment in the media. (Kim, M. 2017.) 
There are several cases where Samsung has showcased its willingness to control the media, 
but it is not the purpose of this thesis to go through them all here. In conclusion, it should 
suffice to say, that investigating and exploring whether the media provided Samsung any 
special treatment amidst its current scandal is well worth researching.  
3 Methodology 
In this chapter, I will formulate my research questions, hypotheses, and methods of research. 
I will explain how I formed my sample and how I processed it, and how the results of this 
research came to be.  
3.1 Research outline 
The aim of this study, as briefly mentioned in the previous chapters already, is to examine 
frames used by South Korean newspapers in reporting about the scandal(s) including Choi 
Soon-sil, Park Geun-hye, and Jay Y. Lee in 2016-2017. For the purpose of this research, I 
chose national newspapers to get the widest possible coverage. Regional newspapers are 
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smaller in market share and circulation, and since politics in South Korea tend to be very 
regionalized and thus the sentiments towards any politician can change depending on where 
they’re from, it was for the best to choose newspapers with no specific regional ties. The 
national newspapers are all based in Seoul which of course shouldn’t be considered politically 
neutral by any means, but given the papers’ nationwide reach, it’s probable they would have 
an incentive not to pick sides in the southwest-southeast divide. 
As discussed earlier, most South Korean newspapers represent specific political alignments, 
be it conservative or progressive. As such, I deemed it important to choose one newspaper 
from both sides to make the comparison more interesting. JoongAng was chosen from the 
conservative spectrum due to its large market share, but also because of its direct ties to the 
Samsung Group. Analyzing its reporting on Jay Y. Lee especially would be of particular 
interest. From the more progressive end of the spectrum, I chose Hankyoreh. It’s one of the 
biggest liberal newspapers on the market and as shown earlier, has been both willing and able 
to criticize Samsung in the past, although with quite severe consequences.  
My original intent was to add even more newspapers to the sample to be better able to contrast 
conservative newspapers with progressive newspapers. With only two newspapers, it is harder 
to say if their journalistic choices are due to their political alignments, or just individual 
decisions made by the journalists in question. Problem was, however, that within the scope of 
this thesis it would not have been possible to analyze such a large sample effectively. Under 
these circumstances, I was only able to focus on two newspapers. Comparing all major 
national newspapers together will remain as a future possibility for further research into the 
matter. 
News articles from both Hankyoreh and JoongAng were acquired online due to their easy 
accessibility by both me and the Korean general public. Internet coverage and usage is one of 
the highest in the world in South Korea, and as such, online newspapers are very accessible 
for most Koreans. The exact manner in which the article samples were collected will be 
explored in more detail later. 
The research questions for this thesis are as follows: 
1. How are articles concerning Choi framed by Hankyoreh and JoongAng? 
2. How are articles concerning Park framed by Hankyoreh and JoongAng? 
3. How are articles concerning Lee framed by Hankyoreh and JoongAng? 
4. Do these frames change over time? If so, how and why? 
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The hypotheses, based on the historical analysis of press freedom and the typical patterns of 
media practice described in chapter 2, are as follows: 
1. Jay Y. Lee’s involvement in the scandal is most likely covered to a different extent 
and in different frames than that of Choi or Park. 
2. Progressive Hankyoreh covers the scandal of the conservative president differently 
than conservative JoongAng. 
3. Both newspapers frame their articles concerning Choi similarly due to her lack of real 
political or economic influence and her general unpopularity in the public eye. 
To analyze my sample and to make interpretations out of it, I used both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. Quantitative measures include taking into account the number of 
articles written on each person, the length of the articles, how many times certain words or 
themes appeared in the articles, etc. For qualitative approach, I employed elements of critical 
linguistics, critical discourse analysis, and framing analysis. The exact process will be 
described in more detail next. 
3.2 Theoretical framework and methodology  
I began looking for suitable theory and method from discourse analysis, seeing that it is quite 
commonly used in humanities, but after some research into the topic I decided to go with 
framing theory as my leading theoretical background instead. This is not to say that no 
elements of discourse analysis, and more specifically critical discourse analysis, were used in 
the process of writing this thesis, but framing theory should be considered the main theoretical 
framework for the analysis made. I will detail this more later but first, let us take a brief look 
at framing theory. 
Framing theory and analysis is very common in the field of news analysis. The word ‘frame’ 
is also used in discourse analysis, but its definition is often different from the one used in 
media analysis (Tannen 1993, Ensink and Sauer 2003). It also appears that even within 
discourse analysis, the use and definition of frames can vary quite a bit, although this is not 
uncommon for any term, no matter what the field it belongs to. In the context of discourse 
analysis, the terms perspective and perspectivising seem to be closer to how news and media 
analysis understands frames and framing (Ensink and Sauer 2003).  
According to Robert Entman, professor of media and public affairs at George Washington 
University, framing is “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
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salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described. -- Framing -- includes similar functions: selection and highlighting, and the use of 
highlighted elements to construct an argument about problems and their causation, evaluation, 
and/or solution.” (1993, 52-53). In other words, framing refers to the ways in which media 
and the news can control or influence how the audience sees or understands any one event or 
issue. 
Entman also points out how omissions also play a role in the process of framing: “frames 
select and call attention to particular aspects of the reality described, which logically means 
that frames simultaneously direct attention away from other aspects. Most frames are defined 
by what they omit as well as include, and the omissions of potential problem definitions, 
explanations, evaluations, and recommendations may be as critical as the inclusions in 
guiding the audience” (1993, 54). The words ‘the reality described’ are worth taking notice 
of. Even the news, that we often perceive to be objective and honest, can’t project the events 
exactly as they are to the most minute detail. Instead, they have to use words, that is to say, 
discourse, to describe them to us, and in doing so, whether intentional or not, they build in 
interpretations and assumptions about it- they frame it, and this cannot be avoided.  
This is not to say that media is inherently biased, or that we cannot trust the media. What this 
is pointing out is that news media is a part of discourse, and as such, all the laws of discourse 
apply to it. Roger Fowler, who worked as a professor of English and Linguistics at the 
University of East Anglia and was a well-known critical linguist, calls news socially 
constructed: “Thus news is a practice: a discourse which, far from neutrally reflecting social 
reality and empirical facts, intervenes in -- ‘the social construction of reality’” (1991, 2). He 
doesn’t invoke the words frame or framing here, but it seems obvious that he is pointing out 
the same thing as Entman is. Fowler goes on to say that “-- because the institutions of news 
reporting and presentation are socially, economically and politically situated, all news is 
always reported from some particular angle. -- Anything that is said or written about the world 
is articulated from a particular ideological position: language is not a clear window but a 
refracting, structuring medium” (1991, 10). Here it is quite clear that we’re dealing with the 
same ideas and concepts, even if under slightly different names.  
Entman also argues that frames and framing are closely connected to power. Frames in media 
can and do effectively shape the public perception of events and issues, which can have far-
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reaching consequences. This is also the reason why political as well as economic institutions 
and actors want to have control over these frames, as well as discourse in general. (Entman 
1993, Entman 2010.) This is not a particularly complicated idea to comprehend, as it should 
be quite obvious to us all that controlling the news or at least how certain topics are 
represented in the media is of great interest to those in power across all fields. This has also 
been proved to be true in chapter 2, where I discussed this particular topic in the case of South 
Korea and its press freedom.  
Fowler also argues that since media groups and newspapers are companies with vested 
interests both politically and economically, it cannot be avoided that this shows in the way 
they choose and write news. Newspapers do not exist in a vacuum separate from the world. 
But Fowler also stresses the fact that certain ideologies etc. are not necessarily intentionally 
imbedded in the news. Rather, this stems from the language itself; all values are built in the 
language and in the modes of discourse available. (1991, 24.) 
This is where critical discourse analysis comes in as well. Critical discourse analysis, as 
theorized most famously by Ruth Wodak, Emeritus Distinguished Professor and Chair in 
Discourse Studies at Lancaster University, and Norman Fairclough, Emeritus Professor of 
Linguistics at Lancaster University, is especially concerned with power in discourse, 
particularly when that power is instituting inequality, dominance, or social power abuse. 
Critical discourse analysis is also commonly used for the study of both media discourse and 
political discourse, since it specifically deals with social issues. Fairclough and Wodak, along 
with other prominent CDA thinkers, also state that power relations are discursive, discourse 
constitutes society and culture, and discourse does ideological work. How power should be 
understood in the context of discourse is as forms of control: groups that have control over 
others through different means such as violence, money, authority or discourse, also have 
power. Access to discourse and the ability to control it are two very important forms of power. 
(Wodak 2009, Wodak 2001, van Dijk, 2001.) These are all principles that are well applicable 
to the ideas of Entman and Fowler, even if they don’t call themselves critical discourse 
analysts.  
To summarize, since to study frames and framing is to study power, and since power is access 
to discourse and the ability to direct it as well, I think that framing theory and critical discourse 
analysis are two complementary theories particularly in the context of this thesis. In coding 
the articles that constitute my data, I have applied at least some of Fairclough’s ten tools of 
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critical discourse analysis to uncover the way the articles have been framed through the 
discourse applied in writing them (1989). This was mostly because I could not find an exact 
description of methods in framing analysis, but also because of my familiarity with critical 
discourse analysis and its text analysis tools. Fairclough’s tools, or questions for the analysis, 
are as follows: 
1. What experiential values do words have? E.g. are there ideologically contested words, 
rewording, or overwording? 
2. What relational values do words have? E.g. euphemistic words, markedly formal or 
informal words 
3. What expressive values do words have? 
4. What metaphors are used? 
5. What experiential values do grammatical features have? E.g. types of processes and 
participants, agency, active or passive sentences 
6. What relational values do grammatical features have? E.g. modes, relational modality, 
pronouns like ‘we’ and ‘you’ 
7. What expressive values do grammatical features have? 
8. How are sentences linked together? E.g. logical connectors, referring inside and outside the 
text 
9. What interactional conventions, in other words, ways in which one participant controls the 
turns of others, are used? 
10. What large-scale structures does the text have? 
These ten questions acted as a guideline for the analysis made, to remind me to consider all 
these things within a text when making the framing analysis. Obviously, some of these 
weren’t effective, such as number 9 which mostly refers to more interactional text than a 
written newspaper article, but these were employed when practical to really look at texts more 
deeply and to gain better insight of them.  
3.3 Data collection 
As stated previously, all articles were collected from the internet, on the official websites of 
Hankyoreh and JoongAng, using their own search functions. Articles were collected from 9 
different events, 9 days total. These dates are Oct. 25th, Oct. 30th, Dec. 9th, Dec. 19th, Jan. 16th, 
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Jan. 19th, Feb. 17th, March 30th, and March 31st, 2016-2017. The events that took place on 
these dates were in order as follows: president Park’s first public apology, Choi’s arrival in 
South Korea, president Park’s impeachment by the parliament, Choi’s first court hearing, 
Choi’s first hearing in the Constitutional Court, first arrest warrant on Lee, the court dismissal 
of the arrest warrant on Lee, the arrest of Lee, and the arrest of Park. The constitutional court 
hearing of Choi and the first arrest warrant on Lee fell on the same date, Jan. 16th, while the 
arrest of Park stretched over two days, March 30th and 31st.  
These dates were chosen as important dates in the progress of the overall scandal. President 
Park’s first apology only a day after the scandal began confirmed that the allegations made 
against her and Choi were basically true, as she admitted to having asked her for advice. 
Choi’s sudden return to Korea also gained a lot of media attention, since it happened without 
any sort of warning and unbeknownst to even the police investigating the case. The parliament 
vote that impeached president Park is obviously an important event, and the reactions to it by 
the media are quite significant for the purpose of this analysis as well.  
Although not listed in the original timeline for the scandal, Choi’s court hearings can also be 
regarded to be of high importance. These occasions were the first opportunities where the 
general public could hear her express her side of the events, and the first time she appeared in 
public after her arrest back in November. Also, the progress of attempts to arrest Lee are quite 
interesting, particularly to assess how the media frames might have changed from his first 
arrest warrant request being denied to him finally being arrested. The arrest of Park was also 
something that the general public as well as the media was highly interested in, although after 
the Constitutional Court upheld the impeachment decision there probably wasn’t much doubt 
about her involvement in this scandal. 
Same search words were used for both newspapers, consisting of the full name of the person 
in question and whatever the relevant event was called. Search words were all entered in 
Korean, and the search results were limited to that specific date only. All search results that 
came up from that date were included in the sample except in the case of the impeachment 
vote on Dec. 9th due to the sheer volume of articles published that day in both newspapers. In 
order to avoid skewing the sample ratios too much and because I deemed the initial reaction 
to the impeachment vote the most telling, only articles published within the 1-1.5 hours from 
the impeachment vote were included. The number of these articles from the first hour alone 
ended up totaling what Hankyoreh and JoongAng would typically publish in a day on one 
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given topic, whereas the total of articles written on that date would have far exceeded the total 
number of articles in the sample. Coding the articles from the first hour or so already made 
the papers’ frames quite obvious, and including more articles in the sample wouldn’t have 
changed anything. 
Some irrelevant articles were also omitted from the sample, if the article did not concern the 
event in question at all and only mentioned it in passing somehow, which brought it up in the 
search results. This happened especially with JoongAng, as it seems to produce articles in 
much bigger quantity than Hankyoreh. Duplicates were also eliminated, since they wouldn’t 
have provided anything worthwhile to the sample. Editorials were included in the sample in 
the hopes that they would give a better idea of the papers’ stance on these issues.  
Some articles that came up in the search results could not be accessed, suggesting that these 
articles had been deleted, although I am not sure why these deleted articles would come up in 
the search results. This was a reoccurring problem with Hankyoreh, especially in the events 
concerning Jay Y. Lee. I cannot say if these articles were deleted due to controversy, if they 
were deleted by the independent decision of the newspaper itself or if it was forced to do so, 
or why the articles appeared in the search but could not be accessed at all. What is peculiar 
about this is that rather than giving dead links, all links were functional but instead of leading 
to the corresponding article, they would lead to totally different articles. One of these 
“replacement” articles was a movie review, and another was an obscure article from a couple 
of years ago. All the links in the deleted articles, as they came up in the search results, lead to 
these two replacements, which I considered quite odd.  
I did not have this same issue with JoongAng. That is not to say that they haven’t deleted any 
articles, but at least such deleted headlines did not appear in the search results. I don’t know 
enough about website coding etc. to understand why deleted articles would come up in the 
search results, but should I find out anything about the matter later on, I will be sure to report 
it. 
All articles were copied and pasted into two text files, one for JoongAng and one for 
Hankyoreh, with pictures, captions and headlines all attached. The number of articles 
collected from JoongAng is 111 articles in total, while articles from Hankyoreh total 95. The 
length of Hankyoreh articles is slightly longer on average, as the word count of all the 95 
articles is approximately 30,000 words. The total word count for JoongAng was slightly less, 
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around 25,000 words. In conclusion, JoongAng publishes more articles, but they have a 
tendency to be a lot shorter than articles published by Hankyoreh.  
3.4 Coding  
All articles were given a code number for the purpose of effective organization and 
identification. Articles from Hankyoreh were coded as H001, H002, H003, etc. and articles 
from JoongAng were coded as J001, J002, J003, etc. These identification numbers will be 
used in the analysis section of this thesis to refer to the articles used as examples, since 
referring to the articles by their full headline could prove quite inconvenient.  
Then, all articles were coded by the article type that they fall under. The categories used for 
this are news, commentary, editorial, feature, or other. The article type can have an effect on 
its perceived credibility. For example, articles perceived as news might be seen as more 
unbiased and reliable than an editorial written by one journalist from their own perspective. 
The article type can be a part of the framing process, and as such was deemed important to 
note down. 
Articles were also coded for the themes and topics that were brought up in the article. This 
was partially a cumulative process, in which themes and topics were added to the list if they 
appeared frequently in the texts and seemed important for the frames in question. Each topic 
was given a number for the ease of writing them down in the codebook. The final list of 
themes and topics is as follows:  
1. Sewol-ferry  
2. Mir Foundation and K-Sports Foundation 
3. religion 
4. Park’s history with Choi (mainly before the 2000s) 
5. references to historical events 
6. North Korea 
7. Chung Yoo-ra  
8. 2015 Samsung merger 
9. Jay Y. Lee’s father Lee Kun-hee 
10. Park and Choi Taemin 
11. clothes, makeup, plastic surgery, appearance 
12. Saneuridang (New Frontier Party, Park’s party) 
34 
 
13. impeachment  
14. other people involved in the scandal (not Park, Choi, or Lee) 
15. reactions and responses to the event(s) from people 
16. special prosecution team 
17. nationalist sentiments  
18. chaebols (not Samsung) 
In the process of coding, all names and ways to refer to Park, Choi, and Lee were also listed. 
The ways in which people are referred to obviously speaks for how they’re being perceived, 
or how the writer wants these people to be perceived. All titles and names were thus written 
down for the purpose of analysis.  
One category of coding is whether the article perceived the event in question as positive, 
negative, neutral, or if it mixed both positive and negative attitudes. It is quite telling if the 
news of someone’s arrest is framed as a negative occurrence, or a positive one, and such it 
was deemed important for the analysis. The critical discourse analysis tools explained earlier 
were employed to determine how each article portrayed the event, so things such as word 
choices etc. were considered when deciding how to code the article.  
Some articles couldn’t be coded in this section, mostly because they didn’t directly write 
about the event at hand. Forcing an article into any of these categories just for the sake of it 
did not seem honest, so such articles were simply coded as “no answer”, although effort was 
made to use that as little as possible.  
Another category used is to see if the articles perceived the person in question guilty or not 
guilty from the allegations made against them. By framing someone as guilty, the newspapers 
and media at large can have a large impact on the public perception of this issue. This doesn’t 
necessarily mean that it will have an effect the outcome of the final court ruling, but it can 
also be speculated that if the public opinion on someone is that they’re guilty, the court’s 
decision might not change the public’s perception. As such, the media frames on this can 
prove quite influential.  
These categories of guilty or not guilty weren’t of course applicable to all articles or to all 
events, but they were used when possible. These were decided through a number of factors. 
If the article dedicates a lot of time and space to list the person’s alleged crimes, takes time to 
present proof of these alleged crimes, omits any evidence in favor of this person, insists 
strongly on the arrest or the impeachment of this person, and/or rejoices the arrest or the 
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impeachment of this person, then the article was coded as framing the person as guilty. If the 
article dedicates a lot of time to defend this person, omits allegations made against them, calls 
for the allegations to be dismissed, attempts to shift the blame elsewhere, and/or casts doubt 
on the prosecutors or the special prosecution team, then the article is coded as framing the 
person as not guilty.  
Last but certainly not least, all articles were coded based on their generic frames. This process 
was also partially cumulative, as the initial frames proved to be insufficient or too limiting. 
The initial frames were created based on the hypotheses made before the coding process 
started, and later frames were added as the coding progressed and called for these additional 
frames. Mainly this concerns the mixed frames, as I did not think of adding those to the list 
initially, which was completely my mistake. The final list of frames is as follows: 
1. positive special prosecution team frame 
2. positive Park frame 
3. positive Samsung/Lee frame 
4. negative special prosecution team frame 
5. negative Park frame 
6. negative Samsung/Lee frame 
7. negative Choi frame 
8. positive Choi frame 
9. unclear frame 
10. mixed Park frame 
11. mixed Choi frame 
12. mixed Samsung frame 
13. mixed special prosecution team frame 
Mixed frame means that the article uses both negative and positive themes. The category 9, 
the unclear frame, was used as sparingly as possible. No so called neutral frames were listed, 
because no such thing as unbiased or neutral language truly exists. All words and all discourse 
carries meanings, whether we want it or not; values are built into the language and that cannot 
be erased. When we choose words to express something, we also inherently express values, 
ideologies, etc. (see Fowler 1991, Wodak 2009.) As such, I don’t think claiming any one 
frame as ‘neutral’ accurately represents language or discourse; even listing mere facts still 
includes some bias, because we still have to choose which facts to include and which ones we 
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should omit, and using language to express these facts means that we are shaping them 
through discourse. Neutrality is simply not something discourse is capable of.  
Hence, the unclear frame does not mean neutrality. It was used for articles that were typically 
very short and read more as lists of statements or facts than fully fleshed out articles and as 
such, held very little information to judge how the event was being framed. Sometimes this 
category was also used for articles that weren’t quite related to Choi, Park, Lee or the special 
prosecution team and as such were impossible to code in the other categories. One such 
example is J017 which is written about Choi’s lawyer Lee Gyeong-je and his educational 
background and work experience. I included this article in the sample thinking that in it, I 
might be able to see an attempt to discredit him, express doubt over his motives or honesty, 
but no such things come up in the very brief article. As such, it was impossible to categorize 
it as anything else but unclear. 
The frames were assigned to each article based on a number of factors, mostly relying on tools 
from critical discourse analysis. Such things as word choices, grammatical choices, sentence 
structures, etc. were examined to analyze how the event and the people in question were 
framed. Previously introduced categories of coding were also used for this purpose. If, for 
example, an article frames Park’s impeachment as a positive event, then it would be quite 
likely that it would use an overall negative Park frame as well, or at least a mixed Park frame. 
I will explain further how these frames are like in the next chapter.  
4 Analysis and findings  
Since the coding methods used produced both quantitative and qualitative data, this analysis 
section will take a look at both of these things to form more solid conclusions out of the 
research sample. First, I will go over the quantitative findings, as those will then be helpful in 
the qualitative analysis of the sample.  
4.1 Quantitative findings 
As stated previously, Hankyoreh and JoongAng have slight differences in their publication 
styles. While Hankyoreh publishes less articles, on average they are longer than those 
published by JoongAng. The average length of Hankyoreh articles is 330 words, while that of 
JoongAng articles is 219 words. This is a significant difference, over 100 words, although 
there is no way to know if all readers actually commit to reading articles from start to finish. 
As such, shorter articles might prove more effective, but this depends completely on how 
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these articles are being consumed. I have no data on this, so I cannot say anything more 
concrete about it.  
The number of times each theme or topic appeared in each newspaper were calculated 
together to see which themes appeared most frequently, and to see if there are any significant 
differences between the two newspapers. The number of times each theme or topic appeared 
in the newspapers are as follows: 
theme or topic Hankyoreh JoongAng 
1. Sewol-ferry 11 6 
2. Mir/K-Sports 34 15 
3. religion 1 1 
4. Park’s history with 
Choi 
3 1 
5. history 24 20 
6. North Korea 1 1 
7. Chung Yoo-ra 19 9 
8. Samsung merger 15 11 
9. Lee Kun-hee 5 3 
10. Park and Choi 
Taemin 
1 0 
11. clothes, makeup, 
plastic surgery, 
appearance 
9 19 
12. Saneuridang 12 11 
13. impeachment 34 25 
14. others involved 30 13 
15. reactions and 
responses 
34 48 
16. investigation (team) 64 68 
17. nationalist 
sentiments 
33 31 
18. chaebols 17 15 
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As seen here, some of these themes and topics are not important at all to either Hankyoreh or 
JoongAng. Religion was mentioned only once by both newspapers, which is interesting given 
how much media attention Choi’s ties to her father’s church and ‘shamanism’ were given in 
the Western, English speaking media. The only references to religion in Hankyoreh are made 
in one column written by a priest, while JoongAng posted one article where Choi is referred 
to as a shaman. This is not done by the journalist themselves but in an Instagram post that the 
journalist is reporting about. This is a rather drastic difference from the Western media reports 
on the scandal, which almost always bring up the subject in some capacity. This was also why 
the category was initially added to the list.  
There are a couple of plausible explanations for this. Maybe the religious connections were 
simply not worth reporting about for Hankyoreh and JoongAng; this is something that is 
widely known to the Korean public, and as such it’s not necessary to even mention it. It could 
also be that for the Western media, the pseudo-shamanist and pseudo-Christian connections 
were simply very exotic and exciting, and as such something worth writing about. This could 
also be a sampling issue, because it is possible that the topic was largely written about, just in 
different contexts than what was included in the sample. 
Very little attention is also given to Park’s past with Choi Taemin. This is also a reoccurring 
theme in the Western media, but JoongAng and Hankyoreh both seem uninterested to bring 
that up. Again, this could probably be simply because it’s not news worthy in South Korea, 
given how common knowledge Park’s ties to Choi Taemin seem to be, while all of this is new 
and scandalous to the English speaking audience. Equally unimportant seems to be Park and 
Choi’s longstanding friendship, which is also hardly written about in the articles in this sample.  
The most popular themes and topics appear to be investigation and the special prosecution 
team, nationalist sentiments, reactions and responses to the events in this scandal, and the 
impeachment. The investigation and the special prosecution team are mentioned 64 times in 
Hankyoreh, and 68 times in JoongAng. This is simply due to the nature of events chosen for 
this sample, as they’re mostly related to arrests and court hearings that are indeed closely tied 
to the investigation into the alleged crimes committed by Park, Choi, and Lee. As such, it’s 
quite natural to bring up the investigation and the prosecution team. 
The second most popular are reactions and responses to these events, mentioned 34 times in 
Hankyoreh and 48 times in JoongAng. Both newspapers dedicated a lot of articles to reporting 
on how people reacted to new turns and events in the process of the scandal. Politicians and 
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normal citizens alike are represented in both newspapers, although JoongAng appears to favor 
politicians and other official instances over ‘netizens’ and ordinary people, while the opposite 
seems to be true for Hankyoreh. JoongAng seems to prefer referring to official instances and 
organizations, while Hankyoreh interviews and quotes individuals either online or on the 
streets.  
Nationalist sentiments are mentioned 33 times in Hankyoreh, and 31 times in JoongAng, 
which is almost one third of all articles. These nationalist sentiments are often expressed in 
quite emotional language, and often speak of the past, the present, and the future of Korea as 
a country and a nation. Oftentimes these kinds of sentiments are expressed as feelings and 
thoughts of the entire nation, as though it’s something everyone agrees upon. The best interest 
of all Korean people is often spoken of, be it in the context of the economy, politics, or 
something else. JoongAng and Hankyoreh focus on slightly different things, and employ these 
nationalist sentiments differently to argue for their own view points, but that will be explored 
in more depth in the qualitative analysis section.  
Impeachment is also predictably one of the more popular themes, mentioned 34 times in 
Hankyoreh and 25 times in JoongAng. Partially this can be explained with the fact that one of 
the events chosen for this sample is the actual impeachment of president Park by the 
parliament in December of 2016. However, the calls for her impeachment began much earlier 
than that. Hankyoreh brings up the possibility of impeachment as early as Oct. 25th, 2016, the 
first day included in this sample, which is the day that Park made her first public apology. 
JoongAng is not as quick to call for impeachment, most probably because of its matching 
conservative political alignment with president Park.  
The biggest differences between Hankyoreh and JoongAng are in the number of times they 
mention the Mir foundation and the K-Sports foundation, Chung Yoo-ra, clothes and makeup, 
and others involved in the scandal. None of these differences are easy to explain, as there 
seems to be no obvious reason for any of them. They are worth mentioning, however, as some 
of these differences are quite considerable.  
Hankyoreh mentions the Mir foundation and the K-Sports foundation a total of 34 times, 
while JoongAng mentions them only 15 times. This could just come down to their differences 
in journalistic style. Since Hankyoreh tends to write longer articles, it has more space to 
mention things that give background to the issue at hand, which this topic could be understood 
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to be. It could also be that JoongAng journalists assumed this to be more common knowledge, 
something that did not need to be mentioned as often.  
Chung Yoo-ra, Choi’s daughter, is mentioned a total of 19 times by Hankyoreh, while 
JoongAng mentions her only 9 times. Hankyoreh often mentions her together with her mother, 
calling them ‘a mother-daughter duo’ and subsequently suggesting that she is also guilty of 
the same crimes as her mother. JoongAng mainly mentions her together with the dressage 
horse that Samsung or Jay Y. Lee sponsored for her as a part of the total bribes given to Choi 
and Park, but hardly ties her together with her mother and the allegations made against her. 
Chung Yoo-ra is also mentioned a couple of times in articles about Choi’s court hearings, as 
Choi herself brings her up as she laments how the scandal has destroyed not only her life, but 
also that of her daughter’s.   
Clothes, makeup, plastic surgery, and appearance get mentioned 19 times in articles from 
JoongAng, but only 9 times in Hankyoreh. This theme is mostly used in articles related to 
Park or Choi, while hardly any comments are made about what Lee is wearing or how he 
looks, which was to be expected. Especially Park’s signature style in clothes and hair get a 
lot of attention from both newspapers, but JoongAng dedicates just as much time to describing 
what Choi was wearing to her court hearings. One whole article is dedicated to her hair pin, 
that apparently caused some controversy due to how ‘inappropriate’ it was. Park’s signature 
hair style, an up-do that she has sported since the 1970s, also gets a lot of attention from both 
newspapers as it appears to have angered a lot of people when she arrived at her arrest warrant 
hearing on March 30th, 2017.  
The fact that the women’s appearance gains so much media attention could speak for 
underlying misogyny. It could be worth looking into the gender of the journalists who wrote 
these articles to see if there is a pattern there, although it is also possible for women to have 
misogynistic attitudes and as such, the gender of the journalist might tell us very little. South 
Korea is not the most progressive society when it comes to women’s rights and equality, and 
as such it isn’t surprising that the women are targeted for their hair and clothes while Lee is 
not. But extending this into the field of feminist or gender studies is out of the scope of this 
thesis, and will have to remain a future possibility. With this data, it’s impossible to tell what 
caused JoongAng to write about this topic more than Hankyoreh. 
Lastly, a big disparity can be seen in how many times others involved in the scandal get 
mentioned by each newspaper. Hankyoreh writes about these people 30 times, while 
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JoongAng does it only 13 times. These include people from the Park administration, Cha Eun-
taek and other friends of Choi’s, Samsung Group executives, as well as Chung Yoo-ra. It is 
hard to say why this might be. Perhaps JoongAng journalists only wanted to focus on the key 
people in the scandal, or perhaps they wrote about these people in separate articles that did 
not mention Park, Choi, or Lee and thus weren’t selected into the sample. The shorter average 
length of the articles could also play a role in why these people, whose involvement in the 
scandal was not as important, were not mentioned as often. 
While the different frames will be discussed in more detail in the next part of the analysis, as 
they have more to do with qualitative aspects than quantitative, it’s worth showing concretely 
how the different frames were divided between the newspapers and the number of times they 
were used. One article can have more than one frame, and thus the total of how many times 
each frame was used can and will exceed the number of articles in the sample.  
frame Hankyoreh JoongAng 
positive special prosecution 
team 
49 31 
positive Park 0 0 
positive Samsung/Lee 3 19 
negative special prosecution 
team 
2 10 
positive Park 46 32 
negative Samsung/Lee 24 6 
negative Choi 37 30 
positive Choi 0 0 
unclear 4 8 
mixed Park 1 9 
mixed Choi 0 1 
mixed Samsung/Lee 1 5 
mixed special prosecution 
team 
2 3 
 
Some frames weren’t used at all, which was to be expected. Neither Hankyoreh or JoongAng 
used the positive Choi frame, and JoongAng used the mixed Choi frame only once. This is 
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completely in accordance with the hypotheses made earlier. In fact, I did not even want to add 
the positive Choi frame to the list because I assumed it would not be used, but it seemed unfair 
to close off that possibility beforehand. Conducting the coding and discourse analysis proved 
my hypothesis to be true. It’s quite telling that this frame was not used even once, and that 
the mixed frame also got so little use, as it speaks for how truly negatively she was and still 
is portrayed in the media.  
Neither one of the newspapers used the positive Park frame, which is quite surprising for 
JoongAng but not for Hankyoreh. Hankyoreh attacked Park immediately when the scandal 
began, and began to call for her impeachment instantly, as has already been discussed. 
Hankyoreh only uses the mixed Park frame once, and the rest of the time paints her in a very 
negative light. This is all to be expected from a progressive newspaper, that probably has 
never supported Park even when she wasn’t tangled in controversy. This matches the 
hypotheses made in advance.  
What is surprising, though, is how JoongAng did not stand up for her either. It uses the mixed 
Park frame more than Hankyoreh, and employs the negative frame less, so overall its portrayal 
of Park is less negative than that of Hankyoreh’s. With that being said, I did expect to see 
JoongAng support then president Park more openly than it did. It is possible that JoongAng 
has not agreed with her and her policies in the past either; the conservative field in politics is 
quite broad after all, and it’s possible that JoongAng has not supported Park for whatever 
reason even before the scandal. It’s beyond the scope of this thesis to explore this much further, 
but it could be of interest to investigate how JoongAng reported about Park in the past, and 
how JoongAng’s use of frames compares to other conservative newspapers. 
Another big gap between the two newspapers is in the positive Samsung/Lee frame. 
Hankyoreh uses it only two times, while JoongAng uses it up to 19 times. The reverse of this 
can be seen in the negative Samsung/Lee frame, which was used 24 times by Hankyoreh and 
only 6 times by JoongAng. Hankyoreh’s portrayal of Lee and Samsung is a lot more negative, 
or at least more critical, while JoongAng stands by Samsung, for quite obvious reasons. These 
numbers are not surprising, aside from the fact that I expected Hankyoreh to perhaps be more 
cautious in attacking or criticizing Lee or the Samsung Group. But then again, most of the 
deleted articles in Hankyoreh were Samsung related, so it could be that they regretted their 
bravery later.  
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Hankyoreh was also way more in favor of the special prosecution team and the investigation 
process at large. It used the positive special prosecution team frame 49 times, while JoongAng 
only did so 31 times, and Hankyoreh also used the negative special prosecution team frame 
just 2 times. JoongAng used it up to 10 times. The only two times Hankyoreh criticized the 
prosecution team or portrayed it negatively was when it demanded more from it and accused 
it of not doing enough, which speaks a lot for how much in favor of it the newspaper really 
was. JoongAng wasn’t against it either, per say, but it had a lot more negative things to say 
about the investigation and prosecution, especially in relation to Samsung and Lee.  
Overall, JoongAng used more of the mixed frames than Hankyoreh. This could be a 
journalistic choice on Hankyoreh’s side, to be more straightforward and more black-and-
white in its journalism. Then again, these issues are something that the general public quite 
strongly agreed on, if the plummeting ratings for president Park and the large-scale 
demonstrations are anything to go by. For a progressive newspaper, it was probably quite an 
easy decision to attack the conservative, unpopular president and her friend. For JoongAng, 
though, the issue might have been more complicated, as its political alignment is on the 
conservative side and it has very direct connections to the Samsung Group and the Lee family 
as well.  
4.2 Qualitative findings: what are the frames truly like?  
This is the main focus of this thesis, where I will explain the frames Hankyoreh and JoongAng 
used in more detail, and compare them with one another. As shown in the previous section, 
there are some drastic differences in what frames were used and to what extent they were 
employed, but there are also differences in what each frame contains for each newspaper. 
Exploring and explaining those differences, as well as similarities, is the purpose of this 
section. This part will be divided into subsections, one for each person, to make reading and 
comprehending this analysis easier. 
4.2.1 Frames used for Park 
As stated previously, Hankyoreh’s portrayal of Park is more negative overall when compared 
to JoongAng. Hankyoreh began to raise questions about impeachment and if there were any 
grounds for it immediately after Park’s apology on Oct. 25th, 2016. Hankyoreh immediately 
frames Park as incompetent, and as a traitor, a betrayer of the nation’s trust. A lot of nationalist 
sentiments are brought forward to express how devastating the situation is to the whole 
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Korean public, and to South Korea’s democracy. Park is thus not only framed as a weak 
individual, but as someone who has rightfully earned the wrath of the entire Korean nation by 
endangering its future and democratic principles.  
“Can we even call this a country? – Right now, our country has fallen into a shameful state 
not possible even in the feudal times, let alone in a 21st century democratic society. 
President Park gave her apology in the afternoon on the 25th. But her speech was not an 
apology, but an excuse. ‘I have received help from Choi in the past in times of difficulty, in 
things like general advice on my speeches’, she stuck with her excuses. She did not have any 
consideration for the seriousness of the situation, or shame.” [H004] 
“Shim Sang-jong, the representative for Justice Party, said: ‘We cannot accept a false apology 
that only ridiculed the nation. If she tries to ignore the rage of the nation that has now even 
brought up the issue of impeachment, she will be met with great resistance from the entire 
country.’” [H006] 
“After president Park’s apology aired today at 4 p.m., another netizen wrote on Twitter: 
‘President herself admitted to the puppet leader accusations. We received an apology but she 
needs to receive a punishment. A president who has made the very foundation of our 
democratic republic falter needs to face consequences that match her responsibility [as 
president].’” [H007] 
The nationalist sentiments and attack on Park continues when Park is impeached Dec. 9th, 
2016. Hankyoreh calls the successful impeachment ‘a victory for the nation and democracy’, 
and contributes the impeachment to the continuous protests held in Seoul and other big cities 
in Korea. Park is effectively framed as an enemy of the wellbeing of all Korean people, an 
evil to be defeated only by bringing everyone together in the protest movements. Pictures of 
crowds holding the Korean flag are shown, protesters are portrayed crying tears of joy, and 
promises are made that the protests won’t stop until everything wrong in politics has been 
weeded out. Bringing Park down is shown as something empowering to the entire Korean 
people.  
“Gyeonggi Nam Gyeong-pil and Lee Je-jeong: ‘the impeachment is a victory for the nation 
and for democracy’” [H013] 
“Head of Kwangju Park Geun-hye impeachment movement: ‘impeachment through the 
strength of the nation and the candle light vigils’” [H014] 
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“Lee Je-myeong: ‘the impeachment result is a beginning for a revolution for our country’” 
[H015] 
“Citizens rejoice the impeachment result: ‘the nation has won’” [H016] 
“Even despite the cold weather, the citizens gathered at the National Assembly to witness the 
historical event were embracing each other and jumping up and down, and some were even 
shedding tears in overwhelming joy.” [H016] 
Park is also very closely related to her party, Saneuridang, and a lot of articles dedicate 
attention to the party’s reactions and responses to the scandal. Thus, she is framed having a 
very direct connection with the party, perhaps as a way to attack Saneuridang given that its 
political views differ greatly from those of Hankyoreh. Not even the fact that Saneuridang 
members largely participate in voting Park out of office is celebrated or even mentioned in 
the articles in the sample, as the impeachment is solely attributed to the Korean nation as a 
whole. All articles from the first hour following the impeachment are very reactionary: they’re 
all interviews and quotes from people celebrating the impeachment, and given how fast they 
were published after the vote result was made public, they have a very spontaneous feel.   
Park’s supporters are mentioned for the first time in articles from March 30th and 31st, 2017, 
as they gathered at the court house to show support at the dawn of her court hearing for her 
arrest warrant. But even her supporters are shown in very negative light, portrayed causing 
chaos and trouble to school children trying to get to school, as the supporters had gathered in 
front of the school’s main gate. They’re reported having even cursed at the children and their 
mothers, which is sure to minimize any sympathy readers might have for them. [H083] It also 
helps in framing Park more negatively; if only people like this support her, she probably isn’t 
a very good person, or someone anyone decent would show support towards. 
Park’s arrest is also greeted with great joy in Hankyoreh articles. A lot of attention is given to 
how her life conditions will be like in prison, clearly gleeful of how she will be brought down 
from riches to such humble life. It is probably seen as humiliating for her to be forced to live 
as a regular prisoner, which is obviously delightful to those who want to see her suffer. Having 
been framed as someone evil who can only be brought down by effort and vigilance from the 
entire Korean nation, her suffering is clearly rightful as well within this frame. Cheap meals, 
no access to beauty products of her choice, wearing prison clothes, and being confined to a 
small space are mentioned time and time again across the articles in the sample.  
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“Former president Park will live in a 10,5 m2 room, eat 1,440 won meals, and do her dishes 
herself” [H092] 
Furthermore, her fate is compared to that of president Roh Tae-woo and president Chun Doo-
hwan. It is mentioned several times that she is the third president to be arrested like this, and 
allegations made against her, the investigation and the court process, as well as her living 
conditions in prison are all compared to those of president Roh and president Chun. As some 
readers might know, Chun was sentenced to death and Roh to 22,5 years in prison in 1996 for 
treason, mutiny, and corruption. They were both pardoned the following year, but comparing 
Park to these two really underlines the seriousness of her alleged crimes. While it is not quite 
right to compare anything Park is accused of doing, save for maybe the bribery charges, to 
what Roh and especially Chun did, grouping her together with these two unpopular ex-
presidents only adds to the negative frame she is portrayed in.  
Parallels are also drawn between Park and her father, president Park Chung-hee. Her arrest is 
celebrated as the end of ‘Park Chung-hee and Park Geun-hye father-daughter duo’ era. This 
is kind of a strange connection to make, seeing that Park Chung-hee’s rule ended in 1979, 
almost 40 years ago, so it is quite unclear how Park Geun-hye’s administration could be seen 
as continuing that. Granted, it was Park Chung-hee’s presidency that really created the 
chaebol system in Korea and solidified it to its current form, but there have been several 
presidents in office since then who have also facilitated it. In this regard, Park Geun-hye’s 
role is quite small, and making such sweeping statements doesn’t seem well-grounded in facts.  
It does fit Hankyoreh’s negative Park frame, however, to make such statements. Since she’s 
portrayed as the personification of everything wrong in Korean politics especially in regard 
to the chaebols and corruption, connecting her with the historical narrative and the main 
starting point of this problem, which happens to be her father’s presidency, makes sense. It’s 
a good narrative, to portray her as continuing the unpopular legacy of her father. Admittedly, 
these statements are only made in editorials and not in news articles, which does give them 
the title of being just an individual’s opinion. Nonetheless, these are still quite interesting 
claims to make, although I cannot say if other newspapers or media outlets made matching 
ones, which would make them perhaps slightly less unsubstantial.  
“Former president Park’s arrest brings an end to an era. The Park Chung-hee paradigm that 
has lasted over 40 years will be set aside and we will begin the cleansing rituals in order to 
make this country anew.” [H090] 
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“With the legal judgment of ex-president Park, the era of the father-daughter duo will now 
end. The evils that have accumulated in politics, economy, and society for half a century will 
finally be settled with this arrest, and it should become the starting point that will open a new 
era of righteousness and common sense.” [H095]  
JoongAng’s portrayal and frames are overall slightly less negative compared to those used by 
Hankyoreh. When Park first apologized to the public and admitted to seeking help and advice 
from Choi, JoongAng did not immediately call for impeachment like Hankyoreh did. But it is 
critical of her, pointing out how her speech clarified close to nothing and how there are many 
things that she should explain better. It does not accuse her of anything directly, but instead 
states across many articles how what she said was not enough and she needs to be more open 
and honest. Rather than immediately calling for her removal from office, JoongAng instead 
demands for the truth: 
“Through identifying the controversy surrounding Choi with the help of a special prosecutor 
team, this can be corrected. 
Even within the ruling camp the demands for a thorough probe through the means of special 
investigation team and inspection of administration are rising. – The president and the Blue 
House should not postpone the investigation and should instead cooperate actively. By 
minimizing the chaos within the government, we can avoid the economic crisis and safety 
concerns.” [J006] 
“President Park should explain herself to the nation honestly and in detail. The Choi Soon-sil 
issue has exceeded the level of corruption and irregularities of just one civilian. In the case of 
the Blue House’s system of managing the country collapsing, this is a challenge that threatens 
the very existence of [our] democracy. President Park needs to reveal in what kind of 
relationship [to her] could Choi come to wield such absolute power, so that the nation can 
understand it with common sense.” [J007] 
This could suggest the underlying hope that by being honest and sincere, president Park could 
clear things up and save the government from falling into chaos. She might not be entirely 
innocent in all of this, but she can prove her character by cooperating with the investigation 
into the scandal and being truthful with the nation. JoongAng is thus a lot more merciful than 
Hankyoreh in leaving open the possibility that she could perhaps explain all this, and rectify 
the situation. Impeachment is only mentioned once in an article where JoongAng collected 
comments from netizens regarding the issue, but it isn’t mentioned by a journalist even once. 
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When Park is impeached, the tone in JoongAng articles is quite subdued and serious, 
especially in comparison to Hankyoreh. It stresses how heavy the atmosphere was at the 
parliament at the time of the voting and how grim everyone looked as they cast their ballots: 
“In the midst of the vote for the impeachment motion for president Park Geun-hye, the 
atmosphere in the National Assembly is extremely dampened and sour. – Aside from the 
camera shutter noises from the reporters present, not even a single noise can be heard. Even 
after assembly member Kim finished explaining the proposal, no one clapped and only the 
People’s party members exclaimed a simple ‘well done’.” [J025] 
It also dedicates a long article to describing Park’s political career, its ups and downs, as well 
as writes several articles on how the impeachment trial in the Constitutional Court is going to 
go, how it will be different from Roh Moo-hyun’s impeachment trials, and speculations on 
what the outcome could be. These articles have clearly been prepared beforehand, in the case 
that the impeachment motion did pass, which is in stark contrast with the spontaneous reaction 
from Hankyoreh. 
Whereas Hankyoreh almost exclusively writes about the reactions of regular citizens, mostly 
those gathered outside demonstrating in favor of the impeachment, JoongAng only cites 
politicians and other well-known figures. In the articles in the sample, ordinary citizens’ 
reactions are not mentioned even once. Two articles, rather than celebrating the impeachment, 
only highlight the fact how this could have dangerous effects on the economy, and the security 
and stability of Korea:  
“’We have to quickly summon a special session of the National Assembly and form 
consultative groups with the political parties. We need groups at least in three different fields. 
Even though it’s the weekend, we must act quickly and form consultative groups for economy, 
national security, and for cleaning out the deep-rooted evils the Park Geun-hye gate revealed,’ 
former party representative An proposed.” [J035]  
This is a very emotionless initial response to the impeachment in comparison to how 
Hankyoreh celebrated it. The peril is not over yet, even though Park has now been impeached. 
Speculating on the outcome of the Constitutional Court ruling suggests that there is a chance 
the Court would not uphold the parliament’s vote, and there are also economy and safety 
related concerns to worry about. Compared to the overwhelming joy and relief portrayed in 
Hankyoreh, this is a very stark contrast. While JoongAng doesn’t side with Park at all, it still 
frames the impeachment as less positive than Hankyoreh does. 
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When Park goes in for her arrest warrant hearing, JoongAng dedicates a lot of articles to her 
appearance and facial expressions as she walks in to the court house. It describes her clothes, 
her hair, as well as her serious expression in great detail, even comparing change in her 
demeanor over the past 9 days leading up to the court hearing: 
“Today, at around 10.30a.m., ex-president Park arrived at the court house and headed inside 
toward the court room number 321 in the third floor without a single word, her expression 
stern the entire time. -- On morning of the 22nd [of March], after the conclusion of her hearing 
as a suspect as well as the reading of police records that lasted through the night, her 
expression was even brighter as she headed to her home in Samsung-dong. On that day, as 
ex-president Park entered the court building, she smiled brightly as her supporters.” [J100]  
She’s portrayed as looking gloomy and serious, and said to have no strength left in her. This 
is an image of someone who’s given up all hope, or someone who cannot hide how guilty 
they feel. Perhaps possibly both. JoongAng articles leave this up to the readers’ interpretation. 
It’s also possible to argue that she’s portrayed this way to rouse feelings of pity, but it is 
unlikely that anyone would have felt sorry for her no matter what.  
When her arrest is announced by the court, JoongAng mostly focuses on how historical and 
record-breaking all of this is. The court hearing was the longest in Korean history, which is 
mentioned several times, and it’s also highlighted how she’s the first president to be 
impeached and then arrested. She’s also obviously the first female president, which is also 
mentioned across a few articles. It’s unclear what the emphasis on words such as record, 
historical, and legacy is supposed to do. It could be done in order to emphasize how awful of 
a president she was, but it could also just be done to make the headlines catchier. In the time 
of ‘click bait’, this is also a probable answer.  
“Breaking News: Park’s arrest warrant hearing ends after 9 hours… the record of longest time 
in history” [J103]  
“’The first and the longest’… the legacy of now arrested ex-president Park” [J106]  
“First arrested ex-president in 22 years, seated between two police officers in the car” [J108]  
“Entering through the front gate of Seoul Detention Center at 4.45 a.m. … first female 
president jailed” [J109] 
Her shameful position as an arrested suspect is also a theme that keeps reappearing. It is 
mentioned how she had to ride the police car instead of the Blue House cars, which is a 
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significant downgrade, that she had to sit in between two police officers and that she will have 
to dress in a prisoner’s outfit from now on instead of her own clothes: 
“Instead of the ‘battle uniform’ style blue coat that she has been wearing constantly to the 
latest important events, such as her hearing as a suspect on the 22nd of this month, former 
president Park will now be forced to wear the prison uniform.” [J110]  
This matches the position Hankyoreh takes on her arrest, although the tone of these articles is 
slightly more subdued. While Hankyoreh is more open about how gleeful it is to see Park 
arrested, JoongAng isn’t quite so direct about it. This matches the general difference in frames 
used for Park between the two newspapers that we’ve already seen; even though JoongAng 
doesn’t necessarily side with her, it’s less negative in its portrayal of her than Hankyoreh. 
JoongAng also mentions presidents Chun and Roh, but the parallels drawn between them and 
Park are not made as obvious as they are in Hankyoreh articles. The historical nature of this 
whole chain of events is mentioned several times, which could serve as an indirect reminder 
to the Korean audience of presidents who’ve also been brought to court for a reason or another, 
but it’s not as powerful as directly pointing out these comparisons. Her father also only gets 
one indirect mention when JoongAng points out the unusual situation of both father and 
daughter becoming presidents. 
All in all, however, JoongAng doesn’t have anything positive to say about Park at this point. 
The frames used shift towards the negative end of the spectrum as the scandal goes on. When 
the scandal is still new, JoongAng clearly hesitates to attack her too directly or to speak ill of 
her, but as time goes on and more evidence surfaces, there’s not much to say to defend her 
anymore. Especially when she goes in for her court hearing, Park has already been impeached 
both by the parliament and the Constitutional Court, which makes her guilt quite obvious, and 
not even a conservative newspaper can stand by her any longer. 
4.2.2 Frames used for Choi 
Although both newspapers portrayed Choi very negatively, their frames are slightly different 
from each other. As stated earlier, Hankyoreh often mentions Choi together with her daughter, 
thus attributing the wrongdoings to both of them, rather than just Choi herself. This is perhaps 
quite controversial, given Chung Yoo-ra’s young age. If Choi had all that influence over the 
Park administration, the people working for it and the president herself, then one can only 
imagine what kind of power she would hold over her own daughter. At the time of all of this, 
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Chung Yoo-ra was in her teens and early twenties. It’s perhaps unfair to tie her together with 
her mother’s crimes as though she was actively participating in all of it. She might have been 
involved, but at the time of writing the articles in the sample there was no real evidence of 
that. 
Hankyoreh almost always refers to Choi not just by her name, but as 비선 실세 (biseon shilse) 
Choi Soon-sil. The term could be translated as ‘shadow leader’ or ‘puppet master’, although 
it’s not necessarily the most accurate translation. Essentially what it means is someone with 
the power to control an organization or people and their relationships without them even 
knowing about it. It is quite clear that this doesn’t have any positive connotations to it. The 
words appear a total of 17 times in the Hankyoreh articles in the sample.  
Other names given to Choi are ‘ordinary citizen’, ‘ordinary person with no public post’, and 
국정농단 (gukjeong nongdan) which translates directly to ‘government administration 
monopoly’. A more eloquent way to put that could be ‘the person monopolizing the 
government administration’. These names and ways to refer to Choi really portray her as a 
sort of evil mastermind controlling the entire Park administration, which is supported by 
articles describing in minute detail the ways in which she did this.  
When the news of Choi arriving to Korea break out, Hankyoreh is quick to demand for her 
immediate arrest, raising doubts about her motivation to return to Korea unannounced. This 
is also one of the few times that Hankyoreh ever criticizes the prosecution team and the police, 
as it accuses them of inaction and risking the chance that Choi might destroy evidence or plan 
shared lies with others involved in the scandal to ‘get their stories straight’. Her actions are 
scrutinized to the last detail and questioned quite severely.  
For example, Choi told the press through her lawyer that she requested the police to give her 
some time before calling her in for interrogation, citing bad health and jetlag. However, 
Hankyoreh articles strongly frame this as a complete lie, and instead stress the fact that the 
only reason why she would come back to Korea would be to take care of any evidence of her 
wrongdoings.  
“Considering all this, there are now allegations being made that Choi’s return [to Korea] aims 
to block the police investigation before it reaches the Blue House. – Choi’s early arrival in 
Korea that she carried out so stealthily appears to have been carried out so she could block 
the investigation before it looks further into the Blue House.” [H033] 
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“’I’m suffering from a nervous breakdown to the point where I can’t get on a plane and my 
heart is in such a condition that I really can’t return [to Korea],’ Choi said in her interview 
with Segye Ilbo on the 27th but suddenly, only three days later, she got on a plane in London 
to fly back to Korea on the 30th. – The reason why these two [Choi and Cha Eun-taek] changed 
their minds so simultaneously seems to be ‘orders’ coming from the Blue House.” [H038] 
All her actions are framed as very purposeful, even starting with her movements before 
arriving to South Korea. The fact that she flew in from London and not from Germany, where 
she was known to reside in, raises a lot of questions in Hankyoreh, and they eventually 
conclude that she must have hidden her daughter in Denmark before flying to Korea. Her 
every move is framed as calculative and intentional, fitting the frame and image of a shadow 
leader.  
Articles on her first court hearing on Dec. 19th continue to add to that image. The fact that she 
denied all allegations made against her is repeated across most articles, and it’s framed as a 
calculated move to stall the impeachment trial in the constitutional court. Rather than viewing 
her claims of innocence as an effort to save herself, Hankyoreh frames this as a purposeful 
tactic to influence the impeachment trial as well. Also, as Choi’s defense lawyer demands the 
tablet computer that started the whole Choi gate to be investigated, to determine whether it 
can be used as evidence or not, Hankyoreh calls this yet another attempt from her side to stall 
things: 
“As Choi keeps insisting that the tablet PC, that is not even included in her personal criminal 
charges, is not hers, people have begun to ask if she’s doing this to raise political debates over 
the issue.” [H058] 
“The reason behind Choi’s strategy of denying everything and saying that the president hasn’t 
committed any crimes either is to not only erase charges against herself, but also against 
president Park. – ‘If Choi denies all charges in relation to conspiring together with president 
Park, there’s a chance that the impeachment trials in the Constitutional Court will take much 
longer,’ one district court judge said. ‘She denied all charges against her and president Park 
in court. If she admitted to even just one of them, the president’s defense could fall,’ a lawyer 
stated.” [H057] 
The fact that her first court hearing took place in the same court room that was used for Chun 
Do-hwan and Roh Tae-woo’s trials as well is also mentioned several times. Like with Park, 
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these parallels drawn with Choi and these two men only help to solidify the idea of her as 
someone who’s committed huge crimes. This only helps in building the negative frame of her. 
For her second court hearing in the impeachment trial, Hankyoreh underlines heavily how 
uncooperative she is, highlighting every time she refuses to answer a question, claims to not 
know anything or that she cannot remember, or just denying everything. It’s also mentioned 
several times how she raises her voice at the judges, which is obviously seen as something 
very disrespectful. Attention is brought to how much evidence there already is of her 
wrongdoings, discrediting everything she says quite directly. It’s thus obvious how little 
Hankyoreh believes she’s telling the truth.  
“To questions presented by both sides, she either said she doesn’t know or gave inconsistent 
answers, repeatedly showing her untrustworthiness and dishonesty.” [H069] 
“Her tablet PC already revealed the truth about her making edits on the presidential speeches, 
the Dresden speech, the study book comments, and many others. Also the fact that the teacher 
who Cha Eun-taek recommended to Choi became the minister of culture and his uncle was 
nominated the head of education and culture has also come to light. – It is obvious that e.g. 
the attempt to raise an issue around the tablet PC’s worth as evidence is just a concealed 
attempt to change the direction of the entire legal procedure.” [H070] 
Overall, the negative Choi frame for Hankyoreh is that Choi is a manipulative liar, someone 
who is cunning and cannot be trusted, someone who knew well what she was doing and who 
had careful plans as to how to take care of everything even in the event that she got caught. 
Even being compared to Chun Do-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, it becomes obvious of how much 
of a bad person she is framed as being.  
JoongAng also frames Choi in this negative manner, but the details of their frame are slightly 
different. JoongAng also refers to Choi as 비선 실세 (biseon shilse) or ‘shadow leader’ quite 
frequently, in 13 articles, but it also uses some even less flattering names. These include 
‘Gangnam host bar madam (owner)’, ‘fake prophet’, ‘보안 손님 (boan sonnim)’, and ‘아줌마 
(ajumma)’.  ‘아줌마’ is an informal way to refer to an older woman, and not the type of 
language you would usually see in a newspaper, so calling Choi this is quite disrespectful 
towards her.  
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‘보안 손님’ translates directly to ‘security guest’ or ‘security visitor’. As such, this is a very 
nonsensical word and apparently, it’s not a commonly used word in Korean either. ‘Security 
visitor’ refers to someone who can freely come in to the Blue House, the president’s residence 
in Seoul, and be treated as the president’s honored guest by the staff at the Blue House. 
They’re not screened by the security guards, and they may come and go as they will. This is 
a word used by the staff at the Blue House about these types of visitors. (Jo 2016.) It is quite 
obvious how this applies to Choi, as her frequent visits to the Blue House have been public 
knowledge even before the Choi gate broke out in 2016.  
As can be seen here, JoongAng uses quite colorful language when referring to Choi, 
sometimes in a very disrespectful way. This is no surprise, given how unpopular and outright 
despised Choi quickly became in the public eye. Using such language could of course be 
criticized as unprofessional, but given the general attitude towards Choi, it’s quite probable 
that no one saw an issue with this. 
When Choi landed in South Korea on Oct. 30th, JoongAng’s reaction is quite similar to 
Hankyoreh’s. The urgency in arresting her is repeated across articles, and doubts about her 
motives to return to Korea are also questioned. Comparisons are even made to the famous 
Watergate scandal, further adding weight to this situation: 
“An Cheol-su: ‘The Choi Soon-sil scandal is an even bigger threat to constitutional order than 
the Watergate scandal’” [J019] 
Like Hankyoreh, JoongAng also criticizes the police and investigation team here for not acting 
fast enough and allowing Choi to walk free, possibly destroying evidence and meeting with 
other suspects to ‘set their stories straight’. In this, JoongAng’s negative frame of Choi 
matches Hankyoreh’s negative Choi frame to a great extent. She’s portrayed as quite 
dangerous and cunning, someone whose motives have to be questioned and her own word 
cannot be taken as truth. The threat she poses for the investigation should be taken extremely 
seriously.  
Only 6 articles were posted regarding Choi’s first court hearing, two of which are editorials. 
Just like Hankyoreh, her denial of all accusations made against her is mentioned several times. 
As stated previously, it is unlikely that anyone believed her to speak the truth, and this is made 
clear in the articles as well. JoongAng actually gives voice to ordinary citizens this time, by 
interviewing some of the people who came to witness her court hearing. Nationalist 
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sentiments appear here, as she’s accused of making the entire democratic system of Korea 
fall: 
“One spectator in their seventies, who arrived at the court today explained their decision to 
arrive: ‘I wanted to see the face of the person who tore down the foundation of our country’s 
democracy.’ ‘The nation, standing together as one, is working to make sure that a rightful 
judgment is made, so we plan to observe [the hearing],’ one couple in their fifties said.” [J043] 
A lot is also written about the nation’s anger towards her and the people’s right to know the 
truth. The candle light vigils held at the time are also praised for keeping everyone alert and 
cautious, although no mention is made that these demonstrations were not only directed at 
Choi, but also Park. 
However, JoongAng makes no historical comparisons, and Choi is not framed as someone 
very cunning and outright evil as she is in Hankyoreh articles, although she was framed as 
such before. Her refusal to properly answer questions is addressed as her “doing only what 
she wants to do and only saying what she wants to say” [J045], which sounds less purposeful 
than calling it a plot to stall the whole impeachment trials.  
It’s possible to argue that Hankyoreh’s statements simply go too far, that there is no evidence 
to back up what they write about her and that JoongAng is being more truthful. But whether 
claims and interpretations made are completely true or not, is not necessarily important for 
frames, and the purpose of this analysis is not to judge these articles for their accuracy. Blatant 
lies are one thing, but even if Hankyoreh’s conclusions were to be seen as unfounded or 
farfetched, it’s unlikely anyone would try to refute them or feel that they’re reaching too far, 
at least in this case. Like stated many times before, Choi was and still is very unpopular, and 
people are probably willing to believe almost anything about her.  
As for her last court hearing, the coverage is far more extensive but not any more flattering. 
Just how with Hankyoreh, her refusal to answer questions is repeated in most articles and 
heavily criticized. The questions she was asked in court are reported on more detailed manner, 
and every time she does give proper answers or admits to anything, it immediately makes it 
to the headlines. Her claims are also often refuted with evidence or testimonials from others, 
which really only helps in framing her as a liar, although not a very good one. Her claims that 
the prosecution team and the interrogations have been too forceful and illegal are not paid 
much attention to, or given credibility to: 
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“Although she made claims about coercive investigation, when she was asked what kind of 
insults or abusive language were used, she only responded with: ‘If the hearing was not going 
to the desired direction, they would threaten me continuously, shove the documents in my 
face, raise their voices, and a lot of people would come in and create an atmosphere of 
complete terror.’ 
When the lawyers further questioned her about how the coercive investigation was done, Choi 
said that ‘It’s hard to even talk about it. I considered just killing myself but it was a situation 
where it felt impossible to do that, but it also was a situation where I felt I didn’t want to keep 
on living.’” [J058] 
Even though the accusations she makes are quite severe, her answer is dismissed as too vague, 
especially because she seems to fail to properly answer the questions that she’s faced with. 
The accusations are not investigated any further than this, probably assuming that none of the 
readers would believe her words anyway. It is also possible that even if people would believe 
that she did really suffer and was treated unfairly, they might think that she deserved it. 
Her appearance is also criticized in a couple of articles. She was wearing a hair pin that day 
that apparently was not appropriate. The headline of the articles just calls the hair pin 
“inappropriate” [J053] and it’s only mentioned later on in the article that the reason why it’s 
inappropriate is because it had a pointed end. Sharp or pointed objects are forbidden from 
people in detainment, and as such, she is not supposed to be wearing it. No explanation is 
given why she has such an item, leaving it open to interpretation if it’s her fault or not. 
In any case, this is quite a small and irrelevant detail to pay attention to, and this really reflects 
how ready the media was to tear her apart. This is somewhat in line with how both Hankyoreh 
and JoongAng wrote about Park as well, when they wrote about her hairstyle and clothes, and 
their disdain for them.  
Overall, Hankyoreh and JoongAng are quite similar in their frames for Choi. They both used 
the negative frame almost exclusively, and there’s never any doubt about her involvement in 
the corruption scandal. Both newspapers openly speculate her motives for returning to Korea 
so suddenly, and they both discredit most things she says in her court hearings. While 
Hankyoreh thinks that she’s more cunning and purposeful in her lies, JoongAng doesn’t frame 
her as quite that sinister, although both seem to agree that there’s nothing redeeming to be 
said about her. This is completely according to the hypotheses made earlier. Choi is someone 
who holds no real power over the media, so the newspapers do not have to fear for 
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consequences for writing about her, and the public opinion was also never in her favor. Thus, 
framing her in this negative perspective holds no risks for the newspapers doing so. The 
frames don’t really change over time, starting from the very negative end of the spectrum and 
staying there the entire time. 
4.2.3 Frames used for Lee 
When the special prosecution team first issues an arrest warrant for Lee to the court on Jan. 
16th, Hankyoreh mostly stands by the investigation team and defends their decision, although 
it does also dedicate articles to allowing Samsung and its allies to defend him as well. 
Hankyoreh stresses across most articles regarding this event that although the arrest of the 
vice-chairman could bring trouble to Samsung and consequently to the whole Korean 
economy, justice should always come first. This is what the investigation team said as well 
when it announced its decision to seek to arrest Lee, and it gets repeated several times in the 
sample. 
“As the special prosecution team stated, the national economy is important but establishing 
justice is even more important. If we just let big companies give tens of millions of wons in 
bribes and gain profits from it and let them control their business management through 
shortcuts and cheats [like bribery], then it will be extremely hard to any longer find any justice 
or order. – It’s obvious that both the one who gave the money and the one who received the 
money should be punished.” [H026] 
To further emphasize this point, Hankyoreh also interviews experts who say that the effect 
won’t be as dramatic as people fear, and that the economy won’t crumble just because of 
something like this. Rather than claiming that this poses no danger at all, Hankyoreh seeks to 
make the risks seem smaller and more manageable. 
“However, Kim Sang-jo, the head of Solidarity for Economic Reform, who has been watching 
Samsung Group for a long time says that if vice chairman Lee is arrested it might have short 
term negative effects but he predicts that it won’t go as far as a complete ‘breakdown’ of their 
business management. – After the news of the arrest warrant application were published in 
the afternoon, the Samsung Electronics shares didn’t drop more than 2.14% despite the 
weakening market. During the Galaxy Note 7 crisis, the shares collapsed over 8%.” [H024]  
Across all the articles, the arrest warrant issuance is overall seen as a positive thing, and Lee’s 
innocence is brought to question, but some separate articles don’t quite fit in with that general 
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picture. For example, Hankyoreh dedicates one whole article to people and organizations 
criticizing the investigation team and supporting Lee and Samsung, without refuting their 
words or raising opposing points in that same article, which can be seen as a positive 
Samsung/Lee frame. Allowing Samsung’s statements to go unchallenged is a deliberate 
choice to make. Had the statements been refuted in any way, this would fit the negative frame 
or even the mixed frame, but allowing them to be expressed as is can only be understood as 
positive.  
If a reader was to read all these articles, they would see how Hankyoreh seems to be in favor 
of arresting Lee and suing him for his alleged crimes, but if the reader was to read only one 
or two articles which defer from this view, they might get a different idea. With Park and 
Choi, there is a more unified frame being built, where almost all articles across the sample 
portrayed the same kind of frame, so it is interesting that the opposite occurs in relation to 
Lee.  
When the arrest warrant fell through on Jan. 19th, Hankyoreh calls it a failure on the part of 
the prosecution team, because they failed to collect solid evidence that the money Lee paid 
‘was given with expectations attached’. That is to say, they failed to prove that the money was 
paid as a bribe. But at the same time, Hankyoreh dedicates a lot of time to proving that these 
allegations were indeed justified and true. It blames the court for caving in in front of a big 
chaebol, and openly questions if Lee would have been arrested had he been any ordinary 
person. Hankyoreh openly supports the investigation team and demands it to keep pushing 
forward. 
“It looks like [the judge] considers that the proof for the criminal charges against vice 
chairman Lee is not yet enough.” [H042] 
“We can’t help but ask, if Lee wasn’t the leader of Samsung, would his arrest warrant have 
been dismissed in such an important situation. – At this rather, people will think that the court 
has surrendered in front of the chaebol’s economic power or that this is ‘Samsung Republic’, 
among other things. Because of the court, the nation’s disappointment can’t help but grow. – 
Without faltering, the special prosecution team has to give their all in their investigation into 
the truth.” [H046] 
This time, it lets Samsung’s side of things only be heard in one article, while the rest remain 
very critical of it. A lot of nationalist sentiments are invoked once again, as they lament the 
‘chaebol system’ still holding too much power over the Korean society, and stress the fact 
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that this does not fit the sense of justice and fairness of the Korean people. Thus, the negative 
Samsung/Lee frame is built partially on the idea that criticizing or even attacking Samsung or 
Lee is for the welfare of the people, and the country’s democracy and fairness of the judicial 
system. Even though this could all damage Samsung’s success and as such also damage the 
growth of the economy, it is too important for the ideals of justice and democracy to let it 
slide. 
“Mayor Park posted on his own Facebook page criticizing the court’s decision in the morning 
of Jan. 19th: ‘I have objections. It’s hard to understand the reasoning behind the dismissal of 
Samsung vice chairman Lee’s arrest warrant in the court house even when ‘there’s room for 
legal debate’. In a society where there’s one law for the poor and another for the rich, there 
can’t be any justice.’ He added, ‘This doesn’t mean that the nation’s desire to reform the 
chaebol system and to make this into a just country has been dismissed. This doesn’t mean 
that the chaebol’s crimes have vanished either. The reason for the arrest warrant request from 
the special prosecution team is still based on the nation’s orders.’” [H043]  
“’Vice chairman Lee, who should have absolutely been arrested, walks free. The law 
surrendered once again in front of the power of the chaebol’, Seongnam’s mayor Lee Jae-
myeong criticized the judicial branch. An Cheol-su wrote on his Facebook page: ‘If he had 
been any other person, would the warrant have been dismissed? If all people are not equal 
before the law, then where can we seek for justice? The court cannot take the side of the 
mighty when giving their judgments.’ [H050] 
Building this negative frame of Samsung and Lee on these kinds of nationalist sentiments and 
high ideals makes sense, because the positive frame of Samsung and Lee seems to be founded 
upon similar abstract concepts. These ideals in favor of Samsung and consequently Lee, 
mostly seen in JoongAng, are built on the view that what is best for Samsung is also best for 
the Korean economy, and thus all of its people. This stems from the kind of thinking where 
economic growth and success are seen as more important than ideals of democracy and 
equality.  
It’s not outlandish to assume that to at least some Koreans continued economic growth or at 
least stability is far more important than democratic ideals. In 2001 Korea Democracy 
Barometer survey, respondents were asked to choose two values out of four options that they 
thought were most important in a democracy. Economic prosperity was chosen by 68% of 
respondents, economic equality by 47% of respondents, while political freedom and 
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participation were each chosen by 39% of respondents. When the respondents were asked to 
choose between two national goals of economic development and democratization, 63% 
chose economic development while only 10% chose democratization. The rest, 27% of 
respondents, chose both as equally important. (Doh 2003, 50-51.)  
While this is an old survey, I could not access any more recent data on these specific questions 
although the Korea Democracy Barometer surveys have been carried out regularly since then. 
It is possible these questions weren’t asked again and that is the reason why I couldn’t find 
anything more recent on the topic, but I cannot say this for certain as I do not have access to 
their database. These numbers are quite telling, however, even if slightly outdated and given 
the other data from the surveys that I could access, the trends have stayed quite stable in most 
values measured in the surveys (Democracy Barometer 2014). Although this particular survey 
is too old to use to draw solid conclusions of the present day, we can still see here how 
economic values have reigned supreme over purely democratic values in the past. This could 
also help explain why Samsung is defended with arguments very much directly related to 
economic prosperity and development. 
As follows, the only viable way to argue against that is to find something else equally as 
powerful. If the positive Samsung/Lee frame is built on the idea of economic values and their 
importance for the wellbeing of the nation, the so-called Samsung ideology mentioned in 
chapter 2, then the negative Samsung/Lee frame has to find something that would outweigh 
those economic values in the wellbeing and happiness of the Korean people. For Hankyoreh’s 
negative Samsung/Lee frame, it means stressing values of justice and fairness, and also 
highlighting how shameful it is that even law fails in front of the powerful chaebol. It portrays 
this as something everyone agrees on, that every Korean wants to see the chaebol owners to 
be treated like any other ordinary citizen in front of the rule of law.  
On Feb. 17th, when Lee is finally arrested, Hankyoreh openly celebrates the hard work the 
investigation team put in to make it happen. It also dedicates an entire article to praising the 
judge in charge of the arrest warrant hearing, praising his dedication and how seriously he 
took this issue. This is most probably done to make the arrest look as justified as possible. 
Hankyoreh also stresses the fact how important this is for the impeachment trials, as well as 
eventually suing Park for corruption as well. Lee’s arrest is seen as confirmation that Park is 
guilty as well, and while these bribes were not the only reason for her impeachment, this 
confirmation is seen as helpful for that cause as well. 
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“The special prosecution team gathered some 50 pages as arrest warrant documents, and some 
300 pages of other written documents, and Han Dong-hun, the head of the investigation who 
was in charge of the investigation for the arrest warrant hearing on the 16th, even personally 
gave a presentation [in the court].” [H075] 
“Even though the first arrest warrant hearing was only [the first] step, the fact that it was 
recognized that there is proof of these criminal acts and he should be arrested means that vice-
chairman Lee’s arrest has made it possible to confirm the charges against president Park in 
the bribery case. This means that she is finally a suspect for having received 43.3 billion won 
from Samsung as bribes.” [H078] 
“As the news of vice-chairman Lee’s arrest were made known on the 17th, president Park’s 
side did not give any statements yet could not hide their embarrassment. They now stand in 
fear that vice-chairman Lee’s arrest will help strengthen the special prosecution team’s 
investigation into the bribery allegations in regards to president Park.” [H081] 
Hankyoreh also dedicates an entire article to describing how Lee’s life will be like in jail. This 
also happens with Park when she was arrested. It’s obviously very humiliating to someone of 
such immense wealth, but probably also seen as something fair and just by Hankyoreh’s 
readership, to have the rich chaebol heir be finally treated like an ordinary person. It also fits 
the demands made earlier that Lee should be treated like any normal citizen and not be given 
any special privileges as a chaebol family heir, at least in front of the rule of law. He has now 
been arrested, like any normal person should be according to Hankyoreh’s narrative and frame, 
and he will be continuously treated like any other prisoner.  
“The arrest warrant hearing ended earlier on the 16th and early this morning at 5.35 a.m. after 
his arrest warrant had been issued, vice-chairman Lee, who had been kept under custody in 
the Seoul detention center, went through the process of entering a jail like any other arrested 
suspect. After checking his identity identification, he went through a simple health inspection 
to see if he had any infectious diseases etc., and a physical inspection. After handing in his 
phone, cash, and other belongings, he put on a prisoner’s uniform with his prisoner number 
on his chest, received instructions on rules living in a prison as well as toiletries and such, and 
headed to his prison cell.” [H080] 
Overall, then, while Hankyoreh’s frames on Lee are more varied than on Park or Choi, there 
are still some reoccurring themes and elements to the paper’s portrayal of him. Hankyoreh 
does give Samsung a chance to voice its side of things, and it doesn’t really critique it much 
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in the articles dedicated to conveying what Samsung representatives or other instances 
defending Samsung and Lee said. It’s these articles that mostly confuse the frames used, as 
they can only be seen as in favor of Samsung/Lee, given that there’s nothing in these articles 
trying to refute what they’re saying. If these articles were criticizing Samsung’s claims, this 
could be seen as part of the negative Samsung/Lee frame, but since they merely quote 
everything word for word in very neutral or at least non-confrontational language, it’s hard to 
justify it as part of the negative frame. 
The negative frame is mostly built on the idea that Samsung along with other chaebols should 
be held responsible for its actions. The frame suggests that Samsung and Lee have risen above 
the rule of law and to allow them to keep doing this is unjust and inexcusable in a modern, 
democratic country that South Korea should be. While Park is portrayed as the sort of evil 
that can only be defeated if the entire nation stands together, the fight against Samsung and/or 
Lee depends mostly on the judicial system and the investigative team looking to prosecute 
him. This is an interesting distinction to make. It also suggests indirectly that as much as it is 
out of the hands of the ordinary citizens, everyone at large agrees to the idea that Samsung 
holds too much power in the Korean society and that is not a good thing.  
As stated earlier, this negative frame is built on quite opposing views to those used in the 
positive frame. But considering for example the 2001 Korea Democracy Barometer survey 
results mentioned earlier, and assuming that some of that holds true even today, it is unclear 
if this strategy works in anyone else but the minority that shares these views. But perhaps 
Hankyoreh assumes its readership to think this way, in which case this is of course an effective 
frame and strategy to use. 
JoongAng’s reporting on Lee and Samsung, as expected, is more varied and less critical or 
negative. This was to be expected, although with that being said, JoongAng is slightly more 
open with its criticism than what one might assume given its direct ties to Samsung.  
On Jan. 16th, the next article following the announcement of the arrest warrant being applied 
for is an article saying how Samsung’s stock dropped following this news. This fits right into 
the narrative that Samsung or Lee shouldn’t be prosecuted, because it puts the company and 
thus the whole Korean economy into grave danger.  
Although JoongAng does give the investigation team a chance to speak for itself, they still try 
to refute their claims with opposing statements from Samsung:  
63 
 
“In the eyes of the special prosecution team, president Park Geun-hye helped the Samsung 
merger happen in July of 2015 through the National Pension Service under the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare in return for this support [that Lee gave to Choi]. But as an answer to that, 
Samsung argues that ‘It was support that vice-chairman Lee had no choice but to give due to 
president Park and Choi’s coercion. It wasn’t ordered by vice-chairman Lee [willingly].’” 
[J063]  
It doesn’t completely try to silence the investigation team, but doesn’t necessarily completely 
stand behind it either. Also, when JoongAng reports on how people and organizations 
commented on this, it does allow both ends of the spectrum speak for themselves, which is 
interesting to see. The total number of articles is very low, however, only 8 articles total, one 
of which was written about the investigation team leader’s stylish jackets and one article is 
simply asking netizens to write their opinions on this issue on a specific website. 
The low number of articles compared to JoongAng’s usual volumes and the mixed frames 
used across these articles reflects a very cautious stance on the issue when the outcome of the 
arrest warrant was not at all clear. It’s obvious that they did not want to write about Samsung 
or Lee too negatively when there was no guarantee what would happen next. This reflects the 
general stance Korean media has taken in the past on controversial topics like this, as was 
discussed in chapter 2, and as such, it is not at all surprising.  
When the arrest warrant is then turned down by the court on Jan. 19th, JoongAng does not 
even try to hide the fact that it stands with Lee and Samsung. It writes very openly that Lee 
“luckily avoided being arrested” [J068] and writes in depth about the problems Lee’s arrest 
would have brought to Samsung and how devastating that would have been. Lee’s 
irreplaceable role in Samsung and its success is mentioned several times and explained in 
great detail, stressing his exceptional abilities and networks as well: 
“’Vice chairman Lee’s most important role is to analyze the markets and meet famous CEOs 
while travelling the world, and in that way map out and plan the future of Samsung Electronics. 
In this, his global network is absolutely crucial,’ a Samsung representative explained. 
Vice chairman Lee has taken on tasks that [other] executives can’t do. For instance, he’s been 
meeting international leaders such as China’s head of state Xi Jinping and diplomatically 
negotiated about private sector issues, and even discussing with CEOs of companies such as 
Google or Apple to figure out the action plan for his company. As of late, vice-chairman Lee 
personally takes care of even recruiting global talents for the company.” [J068] 
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 It’s also mentioned several times how Lee headed straight back to the company to work after 
he got out of the court house, despite spending the whole night there without rest. This is 
probably to help frame him as someone hardworking and who puts the wellbeing of his 
business first. Lee is portrayed as dedicated and focused, who doesn’t let unfair events such 
as this arrest warrant get in his way. This is a powerful image of a competent, dedicated 
business leader. 
A whole article is dedicated to the judge who made this decision, praising him and 
highlighting his credentials to frame his decision as justified and right. Some articles do quote 
people who disagree with the court’s decision to not arrest him, but more attention is given to 
those who agree with it. It’s also reported how Samsung’s stock started to rise again, adding 
to the positive Samsung/Lee frame to show the positive effects of this event.  
There are also a lot more articles written about this than there were on Jan. 16th. Additionally, 
there’s one editorial in the sample as well, and its author very openly stands with Samsung 
and Lee. In the editorial, the author very strongly insists that the special prosecution team 
should only focus on prosecuting Park and Choi, and not try to extend the investigation into 
the chaebols connected with the scandal: 
“This arrest warrant refusal should overall be taken as a chance to restore the direction of the 
investigation. Above all, the special prosecution team needs to restore the focus of their 
investigation from ‘corporation investigation’ back to the original ‘Park Geun-hye and Choi 
Soon-sil government monopoly’ direction.” [J079] 
From all this, it’s very obvious how JoongAng frames Samsung and Lee in a positive way, 
while criticizing the investigation team for going after them. While some critical opinions are 
reported, a lot more focus is given to how fortunate it is that Lee wasn’t arrested. 
Once again, rather than making clear claims of Lee’s innocence, the positive frame is built 
upon the fact how important Lee is to Samsung’s success, and how important Samsung’s 
success is to all of South Korea. Samsung is literally too big to fall. In this, JoongAng and 
Hankyoreh have their biggest differences. 
When Lee finally is arrested on Feb. 17th, JoongAng’s frames become more mixed. Perhaps 
surprisingly, it doesn’t attack the court or the investigation team at all, but rather dedicates 
quite a bit of attention to explaining why the arrest warrant was successful this time around, 
making it seem more rational and reasonable. It also reports in length about the hard work the 
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investigation team put in to gather all the evidence it needed to make the arrest possible, which 
serves to support the positive frame of the investigation team:  
“The special prosecution team put everything on the line for three weeks to gather proof and 
evidence for the bribery allegations against vice chairman Lee. – At the actual arrest warrant 
hearing, the special prosecution team brought in a whole suitcase full of documents to present 
their case.” [J092] 
The hard work the investigation team put in is praised here, giving the arrest more credibility. 
It’s an odd contrast, given that it would fit the positive Samsung/Lee frame better to try and 
discredit the special prosecution team and the work they’ve done. JoongAng spoke against 
the prosecution team continuing to look into conglomerates on Jan. 19th, and carrying on down 
that path would have been quite easy to do. 
It also reports on how Lee will be living his life like any other arrested prisoner, just how it 
did with Park as well. Again, prison life is a very humiliating change in lifestyle for the 
Samsung founder family member, although it’s possible that JoongAng wanted to rouse pity 
rather than glee in its readers. It’s impossible to tell, however, how the readers would have 
reacted to this. 
But JoongAng does not completely switch its frames of Lee and Samsung. It reports on how 
the Samsung Group stock began to fall as the news of Lee’s arrest broke out and also describes 
Samsung’s reactions:  
“The arrest of vice-chairman Lee leaves Samsung in shock 
The first time in its 79-year-long history that its leader has been arrested has Samsung fall 
into a state of panic. – Even its normal, day-to-day business activities will be affected 
negatively.” [J091]  
“Samsung Group’s is now in a state of emergency. If there is no leader in its control tower, 
pushing forward will become increasingly more difficult.” [J096] 
The possible negative outcomes of this event are explored in depth, describing the possible 
perils that Samsung could now face, which is only befitting for the earlier narratives. Once 
again it is shown that Lee’s innocence is not what is important, but the state of his company 
is. Like before, his exceptional role in managing the company is highlighted time and time 
again, although it is quite hard to believe that a conglomerate the size of Samsung would be 
so incapacitated by just removing one person from its top-level management.  
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It also reports on comments in favor of the arrest, where a lot of nationalist sentiments are 
invoked once again. The politicians quoted insist that this is a new beginning for the Republic 
of Korea, that there’s new hope for the whole nation, and how the judicial system has proven 
its fairness with this difficult decision. But there are still comments included from Samsung 
as well, so there’s again a duality of opinions being showcased here. 
The last article in the sample is an editorial insisting that just because Lee has been arrested, 
it doesn’t mean he’s guilty of anything. This is of course true, and typically in a fair justice 
system everyone is ‘innocent until proven otherwise’, but in this context, this seems like an 
obvious attempt at defending Lee, especially because no such statement is made in regards to 
Park and Choi, at least in the articles in the sample. It’s quite telling that Lee should be 
considered innocent until proven guilty, while Park and Choi are framed as more or less guilty 
long before their trials even begin. No mention of ‘innocent until proven guilty’ are made in 
regards to the two women, whereas Lee is treated a lot more fairly.  
5 Conclusions 
The purpose of this last chapter is to summarize the analysis made in the previous chapters in 
a comprehensive manner, and coherently answer the research questions one by one. I believe 
that an attentive reader has already been able to find these answers, but I think that a 
comprehensive and systematic review is still in order.  
First, how are articles concerning Choi framed by Hankyoreh and JoongAng? The simple 
answer is that they’re framed very negatively by both of the newspapers. This is completely 
in accordance with the hypothesis made beforehand. Choi was and still is highly unpopular 
in the public eye, which is probably the biggest reason for this kind of frame. It would have 
been very odd for any newspaper to take her side, or to try and frame her more positively. 
There’s very little to defend her with, and it’s probable that the journalists felt the same kind 
of anger towards her as did the ordinary citizens as well. Also, the fact that she holds no power 
especially now after Park was removed from office, means that no newspaper or media outlet 
has to worry about possible backlash from writing about her critically or negatively.  There is 
no reason for media to practice self-censorship when writing about her, because she cannot 
attack them back financially or legally. 
Hankyoreh especially portrays her as very cunning and purposeful in all of her actions and 
lies. Everything that she says or does is scrutinized to the smallest detail, and her motives are 
67 
 
always being speculated even when there’s little evidence to back up these speculations. She’s 
a true shadow leader, who leaves nothing up to fate, and to the very last moment is still trying 
to manipulate those around her and the entire court process as well. Overall, she’s framed as 
sinister and evil, someone well deserving of the people’s anger and disappointment. Her 
daughter is also framed as a part of her criminal plans, despite her very young age when all 
of this was taking place. Choi is shown to be someone with no redeeming qualities, someone 
who’s hungry for power and willing to use it to her own advantage. 
JoongAng’s frame of her is slightly different, even if just as negative. She’s being framed as 
a liar and a shadow leader just like in Hankyoreh, but her actions and especially her alleged 
lies in the court hearings are not framed as purposeful and intentional as they are in Hankyoreh. 
While she’s very much a target of tremendous anger and disappointment, she isn’t quite the 
evil mastermind to JoongAng that Hankyoreh frames her as being. This is could be either 
because JoongAng doesn’t believe her to be that intelligent, that evil, or they’re more hesitant 
to jump into conclusions than Hankyoreh is. Especially her refusal to answer questions in 
court is framed more as a weak attempt to avoid the charges, but not as something so carefully 
planned as what Hankyoreh claims it to be. Either way, both newspapers write about her in 
very negative frames.  
Then what about the articles concerning Park? As expected, Hankyoreh is indeed also very 
negative in its writing about her as well. This is no surprise, given her political stance and 
how that contradicts Hankyoreh’s political alignment. Hankyoreh has no reason to defend her, 
and it probably hasn’t defended her even with her past scandals like the Sewol-ferry incident. 
Nationalist sentiments are invoked as she’s framed as someone who has endangered the very 
foundation of Korea’s democracy and Korea’s future as a nation, and her fall is celebrated 
openly and joyously. Her removal from office and her arrest are framed as a new beginning 
for all of Korea, as a country and a nation, and bold connections are drawn between her and 
past presidents who’ve also committed bad deeds in the past. Bringing her down required 
vigilance and effort from the whole nation, and the success of the candle light vigils and 
protests is seen as something empowering for all of South Korea. Hankyoreh’s frames of her 
stay consistent throughout the scandal. 
Surprisingly, JoongAng doesn’t stand by her to the degree that I expected before conducting 
my research. While JoongAng isn’t as quick to attack her when the scandal broke out, and 
doesn’t celebrate her impeachment the same way that Hankyoreh does, it still doesn’t defend 
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Park either. Rather than using just the negative frame of Park, JoongAng employs the mixed 
frame more instead. Less attention is given to the public protests especially in relation to her 
impeachment, and when she’s arrested, JoongAng portrays her as rather pitiful and weak, 
instead of rejoicing the end of her career and her imprisonment. She’s not connected with the 
past presidents or even with her father, although the uniqueness of her situation makes 
headlines several times, probably to tempt more people to click on the articles.  
Overall, JoongAng has a more mixed message when reporting on Park, although it grows 
more negative as the scandal progresses. It’s not simple to say for sure why that might be; 
perhaps there was very little to defend her with, or perhaps JoongAng hasn’t exactly agreed 
with her political views in the past, and thus isn’t as avid of a supporter as other conservative 
newspapers might have been. To determine that, I would have to carry out further research 
into how JoongAng has reported on Park in the past, but unfortunately that is outside the scope 
of this thesis and will have to remain a future possibility.  
There were also surprises in the frames used for Lee and Samsung overall. I did not expect 
Hankyoreh to attack Lee so openly, especially before his arrest, although the attacks against 
him were usually disguised more as positive frames and open support to the special 
investigation team working to arrest him. Hankyoreh’s open disappointment when Lee’s 
arrest fell through was quite unexpected, although as I’ve stated before, the problem with 
deleted articles in Hankyoreh searches were only related to articles published about Lee. Thus, 
it could be that the newspaper had to impose self-censorship on itself later, in the fear of 
consequences or backlash.  
To look further into this matter, I would have to be in direct contact with the Hankyoreh staff 
to ask them about it, but I doubt I would be so welcome to ask such questions especially on a 
topic so delicate. Nonetheless, it seems to me based on my sample, that Hankyoreh has gotten 
over most of its fear for Samsung and the possible negative outcomes of reporting negatively 
on the company and its leadership. This is a very positive finding given how crucial it is to 
have a press willing to expose the wrongdoings of the powerful in the society, be it in politics 
or in economy.  
JoongAng, as expected, portrayed Lee more positively, and especially when his arrest warrant 
was refused, very openly supports the court’s decision. But it is somewhat surprising to see 
even JoongAng willing to use the mixed frame along with the positive, giving some credibility 
to the special prosecution team and their investigation into Lee’s actions. They could have 
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simply chosen to discredit them completely and try to make them look bad in an attempt to 
defend Lee more, but they chose not to do that. This is a positive finding in regards to press 
freedom and credibility, although it could also speak for the severity of the situation, and how 
the public opinion was like at the time; perhaps standing behind Lee and blindly defending 
him from the allegations would not have reflected well on the newspaper. But it is also very 
clear that JoongAng took a more cautious route in reporting about the issue, only getting 
slightly braver when Lee was officially arrested.  
This fits with the general pattern on press and how they write about scandals described in 
previous chapters. The newspapers usually find the courage to write negatively about people 
in power only when it’s crystal clear that the allegations made against them are true, in this 
case when Lee was arrested as a suspect. The frames growing more negative as the Lee case 
went on is true for both Hankyoreh and JoongAng. Still, the fact that JoongAng would give 
credibility to the opposing side, the special prosecution team, was a pleasant surprise and a 
tentative sign for how the Korean press continues to grow more mature and honest. 
As my final thoughts, I think this thesis shows how important it is to consider the motives and 
connections each news source has both within the issues it writes about as well as businesses 
with economic, and sometimes political, interests. News and newspapers act as parts of 
discourse and are forever unable to move onto the higher plane of existence where objectivity 
would be a feasible goal, because within the limits of human language no such thing is 
possible. We often forget that news isn’t objective but as we can see here, the way issues, 
events, and people are framed can change a lot from one media outlet to another. To gain a 
deeper understanding of the world, we have to seek knowledge from multiple sources to get 
closer to the truth. 
As for what this means for the Korean media, it’s even more important to understand why the 
newspapers write about certain issues the way that they do. Political alignments as well as 
economic interests, and powerful people entwined in these issues all play a role in how events 
are portrayed. It’s a good sign, however, that there are tentative steps being taken towards 
more independent media that isn’t afraid to go after even the big fish in the pond. While the 
Samsung ideology is still very much a thing that cannot be dismissed or ignored, as proven in 
the leaked text messages from August of 2017, there are still journalists out there who are 
willing to write critically about the company and its leadership. Hopefully once the negative 
changes made in press freedom under the Park administration are reversed, this could mean 
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that Korea’s press can continue to fulfill its watchdog role not only in politics, but in economy 
as well.   
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